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ABSTRACT 
 
Conflict is an inherent part of any service relationship, and is one of the important 
methods of effective organisational functioning. Depending on its management, it has 
both constructive and negative outcomes. The most extreme outcome of conflict in an 
industrial relationship is a strike. The South African Public Service strike of 2007 was 
the most protracted and united strike in the history of South Africa. In order to provide 
an insight into this strike, this treatise explores the following key aspects: 
 
• To present a short background of collective bargaining in the public 
sector through time. 
• To provide a short background to the public sector strike in 2007. 
• To develop a conflict model for analytic purposes based on a literature review and to 
use the conflict model to analyse the strike. 
 
A study of the strike was deemed essential because of its current nature and it being 
charged with political undertones. Moreover, conflict in the employment relationship has 
had an important influence on theories of industrial relations. The South African labour 
relations system is pluralist in nature, with a focus on the formal institutions of industrial 
relations. The focus should be on the motives and actions of parties in the employment 
relationship. Hence, one should look beyond conventional explanations in 
understanding conflict. 
 
Chapter 1 commences with a motivation for the study and the research objectives. The 
underlying research design and methodology that will be employed is also presented, 
as well as the methods of data collection and limitations of the study.  This chapter 
concludes with an elaborate list of definition and terms that is important to clarify since it 
enhances the theoretical analysis of this treatise. 
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Chapter 2 is an elaborate literature review on conflict and lays the theoretical foundation 
of this treatise. It starts with an analysis of the perspectives of conflict. This is important, 
since a country’s labour relations system, and in particular, the employment 
relationship, is profoundly influenced by these perspectives. The main focus of this 
chapter sees the integration of existing models of conflict in order to arrive at an 
informed analysis of the strike. Moreover, it examines the strike process as well as 
strike escalation. It concludes with looking at the outcomes of conflict. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a background on collective bargaining in the South African public 
sector, and looks at pertinent agreements between the state as employer and organised 
labour. A detailed part of this chapter also focuses on the various public service 
bargaining councils. Chapter 4 focuses on an analysis of the process of the strike as it 
unfolded. It attempts to provide a chronological account, coupled with an analysis of 
events starting with the causes of the strike, the process and conflict behaviour. 
 
 
Chapter 5 concludes with by briefly discussing the pertinent issues that constituted the 
research up to chapter 4. This chapter debates whether the strike points to a deeper 
class and ideological struggle in the state, and the economy of contemporary South 
African society. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
There are approximately one million employees that fall within the scope of the 
South African public service, making it South Africa’s largest single employer 
accounting for about 20 percent of all formal employment and about 10 percent of 
the entire labour force (Huluman, 2005). 
 
The South African public servants’ strike that started on 1 June 2007 was the largest 
strike in the history of strikes in South Africa. The socioeconomic issues that led to 
the Public servants’ strike, in a context of escalating industrial conflict in both the 
public and private sectors, were much deeper and more complex than a small 
percentage difference over wage increases (Barchiesi, 2007). An understanding of 
conflict is crucial for any understanding of the South African Public servants’ strike of 
2007.  
 
A common notion of conflict is that it is detrimental and counter-productive in 
attempts to establish harmonious relationships. In this regard Brand, Lötter, Mischke 
and Steadman (1997) state that “the reality is that conflict cannot be eradicated, and 
forms an integral part of human relationships.” 
 
Conflict can be cooperative or competitive. The theory of cooperative conflict 
suggests that employees and employers can have shared goals. Conflict arises 
chiefly because the parties argue about the best way of achieving their mutual 
interests. The theory of competitive conflict indicates that labour and management 
have opposing goals and interests (Sale, 2003).  
 
Moreover, it could be said that conflict gives rise to both opportunities and 
challenges. Conflict has a number of positive aspects which should not be totally 
overshadowed by the negative way we usually think of conflict.  
Analyses of conflict has fostered a convention that conflict is bad, and that its 
occurrence is destructive causing  inconvenience and outright suffering to individuals 
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not immediately involved in the conflict. On the other hand, it is obvious that in many 
cases industrial conflict has led to the improvement of working conditions and to 
changes which are desirable from the point of broad social policy (Stagner, 1956). 
 
There seem to have been some degree of confusion regarding who called the strike, 
and whereas most sources cited concur that the strike was called by the Congress of 
South African trade Unions (COSATU), there are alternative views. Banjo (2009, p. 
123) writes that most commentators erroneously described the June 2007 public 
sector industrial action in South Africa as a COSATU strike. But, as one of the 
COSATU negotiators noted: “It’s the unions outside COSATU that seem to be 
militant” Bell, 2008). In this regard, Banjo (2009, p. 123) further notes that “unions 
affiliated to both these federations, the Federation of Unions in South Africa 
(FEDUSA) and the National Congress of Trade Unions (NACTU), as well as several 
independent trade unions, were involved in the 2007 public sector dispute”.  
 
 The Public sector unions affiliated to COSATU demanded a 12 percent salary 
increase and other benefits. Subsequent wage negotiations were characterised by 
proposals and counter proposals from both sides. This created a stalemate and an 
indefinite strike that lasted for more than a month. 
 
This protracted strike was the biggest in the country’s history, both in terms of 
numbers and the solidarity across divergent political backgrounds, since unions that 
were not aligned to COSATU joined. More than one million South African workers, 
from teachers to nurses to engineers, went on strike.  The massive demonstrations 
and boisterous picket lines harked back to the struggle against apartheid (Barrett & 
Finbarr-Mullins, 1990; Johnson, 2007).  
 
A strike appears to represent an inefficient outcome of negotiations, but  
Hirsch & Addison (1986) state that an important source of union bargaining power is 
the strike threat weapon; the ability of the union to impose costs on the firm (state) 
through a withdrawal of labour and likewise the ability of management to sustain a 
strike and force workers to bear costs, underpin the bargaining power of the parties 
and the eventual settlements that occur.  
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Given the nature of the public servants strike of 2007 and the extensive coverage 
that it enjoyed through the media, this study is an attempt to provide a chronicled 
account of the strike from its commencement to its ending. Moreover, it will attempt 
to provide insight into the conflict through an analysis, in terms of a conflict model, of 
the factors that led to it and aggravated or moderated it.  
 
The implications of the strike are significant both in terms of a sustained relationship 
between organized labour and the state as well as on the socio-economic and 
political front. In terms of the latter, one would find that labour relations systems are 
the product of strategic choices made by governments, organized labour and 
business in relation to each other and fast changing political, economic and 
technological environments. 
 
The outcome of these strategic choices is crucial for a sustained relationship 
between the government and labour. South Africa’s transition is a case in point and 
as Nzimande (2007) argues, “the key consideration or dilemma is how to recognise 
the special partnership between progressive trade unions and the democratic 
government in a manner that does not undermine the broader objectives of the 
revolution.” 
 
As with other countries such as Poland, Spain and Brazil, trade unions played an 
important role in South Africa’s negotiated transition (Anstey 1997; de Villiers & 
Anstey, 2000). Given the fact that the majority of public servants’ trade unions are 
affiliated to COSATU, a member of the tripartite alliance that is seen to effectively 
govern the country, the strike provides for an interesting inquiry. 
 
Another observation is made by Swanepoel (2002) when he states that “not only 
have South African trade unions played an important role in transforming the country 
from an apartheid society to a democracy, but they also remain major stakeholders 
and role-players in the governance of the country today.”   
 
Moreover, whereas strikes in countries with decentralized bargaining systems are 
generally economically oriented and operate within the industrial relations legal 
framework, strikes in countries with centralized bargaining systems at times may 
4 
 
seek to challenge the political and industrial relations systems in these countries 
(Hirsch & Addison, 1986). 
 
Conflict studies and more particularly industrial conflict and industrial relations have 
been documented extensively (Anstey 1999; Barret 1975; Fox 1973; Pruit & Rubin 
1986; Rowan 1985; Salamon 1992). Research indicates that embedded in industrial 
conflict is a strategic vision of a labour-driven process of social change surfacing. A 
vision that is, potentially, as Von Holdt (1993) states “of crucial importance to the 
project of the long run transformation of South Africa’s blighted social and economic 
system.”  
 
The strategic choice facing the labour movement in South Africa is essentially 
whether to embrace market- driven politics becoming agents of restructuring or 
societal- driven politics, and therefore becoming rather instruments of social justice. 
As alliance partners of the African National Congress (ANC) government, COSATU 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP) provide much of the force behind 
government policy, and it is envisaged that these two partners would want to 
intensify its grasp on current and future policy-making. 
 
Buhlungu (2005), citing Webster (2005) argues that there is a need to understand 
the particular trajectory of the South, where the labour movement is taking a ‘Social 
Movement Unionism’ role working with social justice movements as a counter-
movement to market-based politics and economic liberalism.  
 
1.2. AIM OF THE STUDY 
 
The main aim of this study is to develop a conflict model through a review of the 
literature and to provide an analysis of the South African national public sector strike 
of 2007.  
 
The strike was the result of a culmination of factors that will be examined in this 
study. The period of political struggle leading up to 1990 when the political transition 
process was formally initiated, the transitional period up to 1994, and the period of 
democratic consolidation following 1994, saw numerous political changes.  Trade 
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unions have had to make important strategic choices regarding their political, 
economic and social objectives and strategies. This scenario is particularly 
applicable to developing countries and evolving democracies such as South Africa.  
 
Similarly, Hayter (2002) argues that “in some developing countries where strong 
labour institutions have spearheaded political change, the approach to date has 
been to see strong trade unions as obstacles to development.”  
Whereas this was more so the case for private sector unions, public sector unions 
also had to organize and affiliate themselves with the broader agents of change. 
Moreover, it is argued that trade unions have often been subordinated to strategies 
of ‘national development’.   
 
The current role of the South African trade union movement is the result of several 
dynamic events that occurred during the decline of apartheid in South Africa (Barrett, 
1996). The role of the majority of trade unions in South Africa has been 
characterised by socialist rhetoric in its disapproval of the South African 
government’s macro economic policy.  
 
South African trade unions are historically still largely organised along racial lines, 
but the Public Sector strike was unified despite these divides. Trade unions have 
struggled to redefine themselves in the ‘new South Africa’, and perhaps the public 
sector strike represented a new level of organisation across federation and racial 
lines.  
 
In terms of a general theory of conflict, this study focuses on the causes of the strike 
as well as an analysis of the strike as it progressed.  An attempt will be made to 
bring to light how strikes have their origin in the economic and/or political 
environment in which workers find themselves (Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 1992).  
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1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1. To present a short background of collective bargaining in the public 
sector through time. 
2. To provide a short background to the South African public sector strike in 2007. 
3. To develop a conflict model for analytic purposes based on a literature review. 
4. To use the conflict model to analyse the strike. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHOD 
1.4.1. Research objective 1 
To present a short background of collective bargaining in the public sector through 
time 
Research Method: 
An analysis was conducted of literature relevant to collective bargaining. Apart from 
a library search, electronic searches for relevant information were conducted to get 
information that is pertinent to collective bargaining. 
 
1.4.2. Research objective 2 
To provide a short background to the South African public sector strike in 2007. 
Research Method: 
An analysis was conducted of literature relevant to the build up to the strike. Apart 
from newspaper searches that covered the strike, electronic searches were 
conducted to get information that was pertinent to the causes and progression of the 
strike. 
 
1.4.3. Research objective 3 
To develop a conflict model for analytic purposes based on a literature review  
Research Method: 
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The researcher conducted library searches on existing literature on conflict in order 
to present a detailed literature review on conflict. An extensive literature review and 
analysis of conflict literature was undertaken to arrive at an analytic model of conflict. 
 
1.4.4. Research objective 4 
To use the conflict model to analyse the strike 
Research Method: 
The analytical model arrived at above was used to analyse the strike. 
  
1.5. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
As already indicated the researcher acquired information through analysis of 
secondary sources including a literature review on conflict (both social and industrial) 
as well as strike theory to create a theoretical framework to inform the analysis of the 
strike; media reports on the strike; and reference to relevant legislation.  
 
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
• Press articles that were exploited to gather a chronological account of the 
strike run the risk of being construed as biased accounts. However, as far as 
possible, the author utilized these sources as a means to emphasize the 
process of conflict escalation and strike action represented by the public 
sector strike.  
 
• This is a qualitative study and as a result this type of research cannot be 
subjected to statistical analysis to estimate to what extent reported opinions 
expressed by participants reflect the opinions of the population studied.  
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1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
In this section a brief account of the principal theoretical positions with regard to 
political mobilization is provided. This account will serve to give an interpretation of 
the theory, while simultaneously clarifying the underlying assumptions of this 
treatise. It should be noted that the theory as outlined in this section serves to inform 
the understanding and interpretation of the empirical research presented in this 
treatise.  
 
1.7.1 Conflict theory 
 
Since conflict theory forms the foundation of this study, a thorough literature review 
on conflict theory is presented in Chapter 2. At this stage a concise overview of 
conflict theory is deemed sufficient.  
 
Although conflict has always been central to sociological theory and analysis, conflict 
theory is the label generally attached to the sociological writings of opponents to the 
dominance of structural functionalism. In the two decades after the Second World 
War, its proponents drew on Max Weber and (to a lesser extent) Karl Marx to 
construct their arguments, giving differing emphasis to economic conflict and conflict 
about power, (Marshall, 1998).  
 
1.7.2 Industrial action 
 
This refers to action by unions and workers to pressurise the other party in the 
furtherance of an industrial dispute. It usually refers to strikes and unions, workers 
and employers, but could also include picketing, product boycotts, sit-ins, go-slow 
strikes and other actions which disrupt the product process (Barker & Holtzhausen, 
1996). 
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1.7.3 The right to strike: 
 
The right to strike is based on the following philosophical argument: 
without the power to affect the course of the events, a person or a group lacks 
the capacity and responsibility to reach decisions. Power is the source of 
responsibility. Without the right to strike, unions will lack the foundation for 
voluntary negotiation and agreement (Finnemore & Van Rensburg, 1999). 
 
The strike is an important trade union weapon and can be used by trade unions 
and employees as a last resort to settle disputes between them and employers 
(Botha, 1986). Bartstone, Boraston and Frenkel (1978) define the act of striking 
as a part of a social process, since it involves “first, particular acts or 
statements of intent on the part of workers, and secondly it recognises the 
grievance of the workers as legitimate.”  
 
The South African Labour Relations Act (LRA) puts a strong emphasis on the 
right to strike and providing protection for workers engaged in a strike. Workers 
may not be dismissed for striking, although strikers may be dismissed for 
misconduct or for operational requirements during a strike. Moreover, workers 
performing an essential service, may not engage in strike activity,  
 
The South African LRA defines a strike as: 
 
The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the 
same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying 
a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between employer and employee, and every reference to ‘work’ 
in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or 
compulsory. 
 
In later parts of this treatise attention will be paid to specific types of statutory 
industrial action in South Africa, and more specifically as it pertains to the public 
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servants’ strike. Furthermore, it will principally look at the procedural 
requirements of the strike, limitations of the strike as it pertains to for instance 
essential and maintenance services and protected strikes as was the case with 
the public servants’ strike.  
 
At this moment the foregoing definition of a strike as a form of industrial action 
suffices.  
 
Barker and Holtzhausen (1996) define the following concepts in the South 
African Labour Glossary: 
 
1.7.4 Picketing 
 
Action by workers or other people to publicise the existence of a labour dispute 
by patrolling or standing outside or near the location where the dispute is taking 
place, usually with placards indicating the nature of the dispute. The aim of 
picketing might simply be to communicate the grievance to the public or it might 
be to persuade other workers in that workplace not to work and to take their 
side in the dispute, to deter scab labour, to persuade or pressurise customers 
not to enter the workplace, to disrupt deliveries or drum up public support. 
 
1.7.5 Secondary strike 
 
A secondary strike is in support of a strike by other workers against their 
employer. The strikers have no issue with their employer, but that employer 
might be in a strong position (due to there being a close business relationship 
as either an important customer or supplier) to pressurise the employer who is 
in dispute. 
 
1.7.6 Stay-away action 
 
Stay-away action is industrial action by a group of workers in the form of absenting 
themselves from work without permission in support of some socio-economic issue 
which does not relate to their employment situation.  
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1.7.7 Trade Union: 
 
The public servants’ trade unions were key role players in the strike. Moreover, the 
collective nature and in particular the unity that was forged in the strike action 
amongst unions that might have otherwise had diverging ideological lineages, 
proved instrumental in making the 2007 strike the biggest in the history of public 
servant strikes. 
According to the LRA (66 of 1995), a trade union is viewed as: 
 
“… an association of employees whose principal purpose is to regulate relationships 
between employees and employers, including employers’ organisations.”  
 
Salamon (1992) in Swanepoel et al., 1997, p. 619) defines a trade union as: 
 
     “Any organisation, whose membership consists of employees, which seeks                         
     to organise and represent their interests both in the workplace and society  
     and, in particular, seeks to regulate their employment relationship through  
     the direct process of collective bargaining with management.”  
 
Another definition is that of the South African Industrial Conciliation Act: 
 
A trade union means any number of employees in any particular undertaking, 
industry, trade or occupation associated together primarily for the purpose of 
regulating relations in that undertaking, industry, trade or occupation between 
themselves or some of them and their employers (Industrial Conciliation Act: No. 28 
of 1956, Sec. 1, p.38).  
 
As cited earlier, the trade union movement positioned itself according to the 
democratisation of the country. On this, Wood (2002) states that “democratisation 
has posed a range of challenges for organised labour in South Africa. The COSATU 
unions remain in alliance with the ANC, despite the latter’s adoption of neo-liberal 
economic policies” 
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However, any challenges brought about by democratisation are coupled with 
renewed strategies to heed the challenges. This ‘strategic engagement’ is vital for 
restructuring, since as Slabbert (1999) argues, “it is a strategy for transforming and 
democratizing the workplace. 
 
Slabbert (1999, par. 5) goes further:  
 
“Thus it engages to defend workers’ interests but it also engages to increase 
workers’ control of production to gain access to training and skills, to improve 
wages and conditions and to improve the quality of working life and 
democratize the workplace”. 
 
But, how are effective are they in the process of engagement with the government 
and more importantly in terms of realising a socialist order?  
 
Anderson (1996, pp. 264-265) makes the following point regarding trade unions: 
 
     As institutions, trade unions do not challenge the existence of society      
     based on a division of classes, they merely express it. Thus trade unions  
     can never be vehicles of advancement towards socialism in themselves; by  
     their nature they are tied to capitalism. They can bargain within society but       
     not transform it. 
 
In terms of the general role of trade unions Basson et al., (2002) state that  “it is 
generally accepted that one of the major functions of trade unions is that of procuring 
better working conditions and wages and salaries for its members.” This is achieved 
through collective bargaining. 
 
Why do people join trade unions? Du Toit (1976) outlines two reasons why people 
join trade unions: 
 
• Economic factors: The main objective of the worker will be to earn enough in 
order to satisfy the basic needs of life, and, over and above that, to be able to afford 
certain status-giving luxuries. Satisfaction creates new needs, and consequently the 
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worker will strive for more economic advantages. 
 
• Social and Psychological factors: Social security is established by association 
with other workers within a union, since the union guarantees reasonable job 
security- only it is in a position to effectively look after the interests of the worker- and 
at the same time foster a group identity.  
 
An analysis of trade unions should be cognisant of the role that ideology played in 
trade union activity. It is precisely because of this that the South African scenario 
calls for balanced exploration into what trade unionism meant at different times 
within the South African labour history. For this reason the South African trade union 
movements draw on two political traditions. One is a highly developed tradition of 
popular resistance and the other an equally developed tradition of trade union 
organisation. Trade union ideology is often a mix of resistance and trade union 
politics, and, as Piron (1989, p.1) states, “have a high political component to their 
activities.”  
 
1.7.9 Collective Bargaining:  
 
Collective bargaining in labour relations is a procedure whereby an employer or 
employers agree to discuss the conditions of work by bargaining with representatives 
of the employees, usually a labour union. Its purpose may be either a discussion of 
the terms and conditions of employment (wages, work hours, job safety, or job 
security) or a consideration of the collective relations between both sides (the right to 
organise workers, recognition of a union, or a guarantee of no reprisals against the 
workers once a strike has occurred). 
 
From the above it can be deduced that collective bargaining is an essential avenue 
through which organised labour creates channels of communication that allows for 
negotiations on a variety of issues affecting the employment relationship. Chapter 3 
will comprise a more detailed summation of collective bargaining as it pertains to the 
South African situation and more particularly how this functions in South Africa’s 
public sector.   
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1.7.10 Public Service: 
 
The term ‘public service’ is defined in Section 213 of the LRA to mean national 
departments, provincial administrations and organisation components contemplated 
in Section 7 (2) of the South African Public Service Act, 1994. The South African 
National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and he South African 
Secret Service are excluded from the definition of public service.  
 
1.7.11 Public Service Bargaining Councils: 
 
Prior to the new Act, the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) and the 
Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA) established the Public Service Bargaining 
Council (PSBC) and the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC) respectively as 
the bargaining forums for these two public service sectors. These two councils, 
operating under different laws, covered only certain sectors of the public service. The 
new act provides for the creation of a single overarching structure, the Public 
Services Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) which should regulate and 
coordinate collective bargaining across the public service as a whole.  
 
1.7.12 Protected strikes/lockouts:  
 
Protected strikes or lockouts are those that conform to the procedural requirements 
stipulated in the LRA the most important legal consequence of a protected strike is 
that the strikers may not be dismissed for partaking in it. The public servants’ strike 
of 2007 was protected only as far as non-essential services were concerned.  
 
1.7.13 Social Dialogue 
 
As cited earlier in the chapter, the insightful contribution of Huluman (2005) that 
focuses on collective bargaining in the public sector, but more particularly on the ILO 
concept of social dialogue will now be focused  on, and will employ large excerpts 
from Huluman’s paper since it encapsulates the ‘practice of social dialogue in the 
South African public service’.  
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The ILO defines social dialogue as ‘all types of negotiation, consultation or simply 
exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, 
employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and 
social policy’. Successful social dialogue structures and processes have the potential 
to resolve important economic and social issues, encourage good governance, 
advance social and industrial peace and stability and boost economic progress. 
 
Collective bargaining is seen as not only an integral part and most widespread form 
of social dialogue but as a useful indicator of the capacity within a country to engage 
in national level tripartism. Parties can engage in collective bargaining at enterprise, 
sectoral, regional, national and multinational level. Social dialogue can take a variety 
of forms, ranging from the simple act of tripartite process, with the Government as an 
official party to the dialogue, or it may consist of bipartite relations only between 
labour and management, with or without indirect government involvement (Huluman, 
2005, p.1).  
 
Huluman states that “South Africa, as a developing country went through a political 
change from an apartheid state to a democratic state in 1994 and the political 
changes have had a huge impact on labour legislation in the country”. Huluman goes 
further and asserts that “the constitution of the country and all subsequent legislation 
has been products of tripartite dialogue. 
 
In its Constitution, South Africa has enshrined the rights and values contained in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Charter and ILO 
Conventions”. An extension of this tripartite dialogue saw the inclusion of broader 
society participating in the drafting of the constitution, thus resulting as the outcome 
of a social dialogue.   
 
The cornerstone is embodied in the Bill of Rights (Chapter II of the South African 
Constitution of 1996). The Bill of Rights contains specific rights on labour relations, 
which confers rights to trade unions and workers (Section 23 of Chapter II of the 
Constitution). These rights are given detailed effect through the enactment of 
specialized labour legislation such as the LRA, 1995, the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, 1997 and the Skills Development Act, 1998” (Huluman, 2005). 
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Another observation is that the most significant amendments brought about by s 23 
are the recasting of the collective bargaining provisions, the broadening of the right 
to strike, the abandonment of the employer’s recourse to the lock-out, and the 
inclusion of a clause addressing union security arrangements (Abraham in De Waal 
et al., 2000).  
 
However, in as much as the right to strike is legally entrenched, there are some 
exclusions since this right excludes certain services deemed as essential to 
participate in industrial action. These essential and maintenance services will now be 
briefly discussed.  
 
1.7.14. Essential service: 
 
The LRA defines an essential service as: 
“… a service of which the interruption endangers the life, personal safety or health of 
the whole or any part of the population, (or), the Parliamentary service, (or) the 
South African Police Service.” 
 
1.8 Treatise outline  
 
Chapter 2: After defining pertinent theories and concepts that are at the core of this 
treatise, this chapter will theorise conflict by providing a detailed review of conflict in 
order to arrive at an analytic model of conflict. The devising of such a model is 
fundamental for an interpretation and analysis of the public servants’ strike.  
 
Chapter 3 will provide a background of collective bargaining in the South African 
public sector in general and more particularly how collective bargaining transpired 
during the strike. Moreover, it will also include a discussion on essential and 
maintenance services in the sector.   
 
Chapter 4 will provide an analysis of the process of the strike. This will include a 
description and analysis of the negotiations that led up to the strike and a visual 
chronology of the strike to aid the reader. An accurately time sequenced diary of the 
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strike and a linking of the strike process to the analytical model chosen will conclude 
this chapter. 
 
Paramount to this chapter is the work of existing theorists of conflict for an 
understanding of conflict and in particular the process, escalation, de-escalation and 
outcomes of conflict. 
 
Chapter 5 will draw conclusions regarding the strike briefly summarising the key 
findings of the objectives set forth in the treatise and reiterating the elements chosen 
for the analysis. The treatise will conclude with a summary of the findings and will 
serve to make recommendations regarding the strike.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. THEORISING: TOWARDS AN ANALYTIC MODEL 
 
One cannot begin the task of analysing so complex a phenomenon as a strike 
without some form of analytical tool (Ruth, 1994). The literature on conflict theory 
and industrial action suggests that this field has emerged as a major educational 
enterprise.  This emergence can be attributed to the changing dynamic of labour 
relations and the increase in industrial action.  
 
Chapter 1 briefly examined conflict theory presenting a summary of theories relevant 
to the research embedded in this treatise.  This chapter will endeavour to provide a 
more detailed literature review of conflict theory and will in the second part of the 
chapter focus on current conflict models and in the conclusion will present the 
conflict model utilized in this treatise.   
 
In a period of radical change, the intrinsic disparities in perceptions and goals of 
institutions and organisations, present conflict as inevitable. Moreover, “conflict is 
one of the key processes of effective organisational functioning” (Lewicki & Spencer, 
1992, pp. 205-207). 
 
It represents “an interactive state manifested in disagreement, differences, or 
incompatibility, within or between individuals and groups” (Rahim, 1985, p.81).  
 
Models and strategies of conflict management are able to “help better understand 
what sort of conflict behaviour will most likely lead to constructive outcomes, and 
which behaviours tend to be either productive or destructive” (Thomas, 1976, p  7 ).  
 
Within the field of labour relations, the three general collections of theories through 
which conflict is analysed are the Unitarist, Pluralist and Radical-Marxist frameworks. 
Central to conflict theories is the description of a conflict of interests between the 
capitalist and the workers.  
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It is crucial to understand some important differences between the theories falling 
within the conflict tradition. The following section will provide a brief synopsis of the 
three conflict theories.  
 
2.1.1. A UNITARIST PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT 
 
Swanepoel et al., (2002) states that for the unitarist the organisation, as an 
employing entity, is an integrated group of people with a single authority and loyalty 
structure and a common set of values, interests and objectives shared by all 
members of the organisation. Salamon (1987) concurs when he states that 
management’s prerogative to manage and to make decisions is regarded as 
legitimate, rational and accepted. Any opposition to this prerogative of management 
is regarded as irrational.  
 
Swanepoel et al., (2002) states that the unitarist perspective is characteristic of many 
South African business concerns and in based upon the following premises: 
o The organisational system is fundamentally in harmony, and conflict is 
unnecessary and exceptional. This has five important implications: 
• Conflict is caused by agitators; 
• Conflict behaviour is perceived as an irrational activity; 
• Trade unions are regarded as an intrusion into the organisation from outside, 
competing with management for the loyalty of the workers, and must therefore be 
neutralized or avoided; and 
• The presence of trade unions in an organisation has an effect not only upon 
efficiency or managerial prerogatives, but upon the focus of loyalty and source of 
authority of enterprise within the enterprise. 
• Employment relations should at all times reflect order. 
• Employment relations should be exercised strictly in terms of a clearly diffused 
judicial system, and set rules and regulations. 
• The organisation is a unitary structure where all levels and kinds of employees 
have common objectives and values. 
• The hierarchy of authority within the organisation should be clear to all and must 
be maintained. 
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• The “boss” role is paramount and legitimate. 
 
In an industrial society this view does not encourage the acknowledgement of trade 
unions, since trade unions are viewed as intrusions from outside competing with 
management for the loyalty of workers. Furthermore, trade unions are seen as 
having a negative effect on the prerogatives of management. 
 
Moreover, harmony is presupposed on the basis of common goals or mutuality of 
interest (Ruth, 1994). Unitarists assume the balance of power between the role-
players in society and in the employment relationship at large; assuming the status 
quo as customary.   
 
Linking with Swanepoel insofar as opposition to management is concerned, this is 
viewed as irrational and to be caused by agitators and blame is shifted to 
employees. Conflict is seen as frictional rather than structural (Fox 1973, p. 302).  
 
As mentioned before, the existing order should be preserved, and everything that 
seems to be the contrary should be steered clear of, even if this avoidance leads to 
authoritarian suppression of acts that are seen to be causing disharmony. As a 
consequence negotiation as a process is perceived as legitimating subversive 
interests, and even precipitating and crystallising unnecessary and destructive 
conflict (Anstey, 1999).  
 
2.1.2. A PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT 
 
This perspective sees society as being made up of individuals who come from an 
array of divergent sectional groups each having its own interests, objectives and 
leadership. 
 
Since society is composed of different groups, pluralists view conflict as inevitable 
and that the organisation and/or management’s role is to manage tension in order to 
maintain a collaborative culture and limit conflict since parties are viewed as 
interdependent for economic survival. In this regard, it is suggested that conflict 
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between management and labour unions is not so fundamental and unbridgeable 
that the parties will fail to reach compromises (Nel et al., 2005). 
 
Should conflict arise, then management and trade unions will use interactive 
mechanisms to settle disputes, since negotiations and collective bargaining are 
regarded as important dispute resolution mechanisms and trade unions are 
recognised within the labour relationship. Moreover, this recognition of trade unions 
results in parties negotiating not only on issues of difference which arise between 
them, but on the procedures and institutions through which bargaining will take place 
(Anstey, 1999). 
 
Orcutt (2002) illustrates the pluralistic interests of group conflict as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A pluralistic model of interest group conflict (Orcutt, 2002).  
 
2.1.3. NEO-MARXIST & INTEREST GROUP CONFLICT THEORIES 
 
Neo-Marxist theory, also known as the radical perspective, has its origin in the work 
of Karl Marx which holds the idea that societies and their social and political 
institutions inherently favour capitalism. The single most important element in Marx’s 
sociological theorizing is the concept of class. 
 
Whereas contemporary sociologists sometimes use the term social class to refer to 
the relative ranking of individuals on such dimensions as education or income, class 
for Marx referred to basic structural components of society as a whole. The class 
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structure of a particular society is determined by the system of economic production 
that exists in that society at a given point in history (Orcutt, 2002). 
 
Having mentioned that class is an important factor of the radical perspective, class 
conflict is viewed as stemming from the distribution of and access to economic 
power, and as Swanepoel (2002) argues, this conflict is endemic and is regarded as 
a reflection not only of organisational demands and tensions, but also and, perhaps, 
more significantly of the inherent nature of the capitalist economic and social system. 
Neo-Marxist theories focus particular attention on the economic structure of society.  
 
Orcutt (2002) uses the following figure to outline these differences as it relates to the 
two classes prevalent in society: 
 
 
Figure 2 - Neo-Marxist model of class conflict (Orcutt, 2002) 
 
Theories of interest group conflict, on the other hand, tend to work with the pluralistic 
assumption that all modern societies contain a number of groups with conflicting or 
competing interests and values. Working with a more diversified concept of the 
political process than the neo-Marxists, interest group theorists contend that changes 
in the law or in systems of social control may be generated by conflicts between 
cultural, religious, or ethnic groups as well as by conflict between groups with 
divergent economic interests.  
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Within this inequality, the working class is seen to have unequal access to 
educational, economic, political and other social institutions. Social and political 
conflict is an expression of the underlying economic conflict in society. Anstey (1999) 
argues that conflict arises from the unequal power relationships existing in a 
capitalist society because the system produces an inequitable distribution of wealth 
and power in the society. In the same vein Nel, Swanepoel, Kirsten, Erasmus and 
Tsabadi (2005) state that this is a mere extension of the class conflict- between the 
“haves” and the “have-nots” which permeates the capitalist society as a whole. 
 
According to this perspective, conflict is also seen to stem from the division in society 
between those who own and manage the means of production and those who sell 
their labour. Whereas the unitarist and pluralist perspectives reject and recognise 
trade unions respectively, the neo-Marxists see trade unions as part of the class 
struggle and should link their activities to political parties to achieve fundamental 
change in society. Whereas pluralists see collective bargaining as a consultative 
process, neo-Marxists view collective bargaining as a means of being co-opted into 
the capitalist system.  
 
2.1.4. CORPORATISM  
 
Corporatism can be seen as an extension of pluralism and is sometimes referred to 
as tripartite coordination or cooperation (Nel et al., 2005). The premise of 
corporatism is based on the principle that business, labour and the state is 
interdependent and not in direct competition with each other. 
 
Nel et al., (2005) describe Societal Corporatism as a social democratic order where 
the state allows the other key interest groups to be full participants in the process of 
formulating certain state policies and in making key governance decisions. In this 
regard, Webster (1997, p. 76) argues that “with the beginnings of a ‘negotiated 
transition’ to democratisation in South Africa, the labour movement shifts towards 
more co-operative relations with employers and engagement in tripartite fora.” 
 
However, there is a another side to corporatism, which is where the state imposes  
its will on the labour movement, and where the state moves into a paternalistic or 
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authoritarian mode to demobilise and co-opt organised labour (trade unions) into 
government structures (Nel et al., 2005). This of course depends on the relative 
power of the various parties.  
 
2.2. MODELS OF CONFLICT 
 
Models of conflict provide a conceptual paradigm within which conflict management 
can take place. Firstly, they focus on the process by which labour and management 
may try to reach agreement on the nature of their future interaction. Secondly, 
conflict models focus on the actions taken by each side to influence the outcome of 
the agreement (Patchen, 1970).  
 
Thomas (1976 in Anstey 1999) differentiates between two conflict models namely 
the structural model and process model. Both these theories focus on the conflict 
handling behaviour of the conflicting parties. Another view is held by Nel et al., 
(2005) that conflict is not observable behaviour, but is one of the determinants of 
behaviour.  
 
Moreover Wallensteen (2004, p.36) states the following: 
 
Central is the understanding of how difficult it is to break the dynamics. 
Conflict resolution has a task in achieving just that, a change in the direction 
of the flow of events, so that escalation is turned into de-escalation and 
polarisation into positive interaction.  
 
Anstey (1999) differentiates between structural and process models which focus on 
the conflict handling behaviour of the conflicting parties. Thomas (1979) (in Anstey, 
1999, p. 11) describes the structural model as follows: 
 
Attempts to understand conflict phenomena by studying how underlying 
conditions shape events… to identify parameters which influence conflict 
behaviour and to specify the form of that influence. Because these conditions 
or parameters are relatively fixed or slow changing… they are seen as 
structural in nature. 
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Anstey (1999, p.11) states that the structural model typically focuses  on such factors 
as personal predispositions, social pressures, negotiation procedures and rules, 
incentives and their influence on conflict behaviour. Therefore, it can be deduced 
that this model moves from the premise that the extra variables that influence a 
conflict situation such as prejudices and the negotiation framework needs to be 
described as a way of understanding the conflict. 
 
On the other hand the process model looks at the internal forces of the conflict 
situation itself and how this situation will influence future events that may very well 
result in an escalation or de-escalation of conflict. 
 
Anstey (1999) suggests that an integration of these two models will provide a 
comprehensive understanding of conflict. Moreover, Anstey (1999, p 26) argues that 
conflict behaviour is resultant of a variety of conflict moderators and aggravators, 
and proposes a more integrated framework.  
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Figure 3 - A conceptual framework for understanding conflict (Anstey, 1999) 
 
Mitchell (2002), presenting a slightly modified version of Thomas’ process model 
(Thomas, 1976, 1979) remarks that conflict is considered to occur in cycles or 
episodes. Each episode is influenced by the outcomes of previous episodes and also 
influences future episodes. The model of a conflict episode has six components or 
stages (Figure 4)  
 
• The first stage is the point of entry and is determined by such variables as 
behavioural predispositions, pressures form the social environment, conflict 
experiences with significant others, and previous conflict episodes with other 
group members. 
 
Aggravators/Moderators 
• Aspirations 
• Perceptions 
• History of relations 
• Use of strategies 
• Constituencies 
• Struggle groups 
• Internal coherence 
• Acceptable forums and 
procedures 
• Shared conflict-limiting 
norms 
• Extent of grievance and 
threat 
• Strength of social bonds 
• Cross cutting group 
membership 
• Balance of power 
• Certainty 
• Strong social controls 
• Deterrent capacity 
RESIDUAL 
EFFECTS 
Conflict behaviour 
• Violence 
• Coercion 
• Negotiation 
• Problem solving 
• Use of third parties 
• Litigation 
• Termination of 
relations 
Sources of conflict 
• Scarcity 
• Identity 
• Structural imbalance 
• Differing goals 
• Coordination 
• Ambiguity 
• Information 
• Interpersonals 
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• Typically some stimulus (the second component) occurs that initiates or 
crystallizes an episode, although it need not be an explicit event. 
 
• The entering state and stimulus lead to frustration (the third stage of the model). 
Frustration may result from a wide variety of stimuli- for example, active 
interference with one group member’s actions by another, competition for 
recognition, the breaking of an agreement, or the giving of an overt or imagined 
insult.  
 
• The fourth step (conceptualization) is vital. The conceptualization of the situation 
by each group member forms the basis for his or her reactions to the frustration 
and subsequent behaviour. This step in the episode could be roughly thought of 
as: What is going on here? Is it good or bad for me? The public servants’ strike 
was confronted by some of these conceptual theories such as issues of those who 
striked versus those who did not strike, which in turn touch on issues of 
intimidation.  
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Figure 4 - A slightly modified process model of Thomas (Mitchell, 2002)  
 
 
STAGE 6 
OUTCOME / RESULT 
Decisions 
Actions taken 
Agreements made 
Feelings of participants 
 
STAGE 3 
FRUSTRATION 
Initiates/crystallizes an episode 
Need not be an explicit event 
    STAGE 2 
        STIMULUS 
Reactions to frustrations/ answering 
and reacting to imagined answers: 
“What’s going on here/is it good for 
me”? 
“You just can’t trust that (type) of 
 
             STAGE 4ZATION 
Result from: 
Active interference 
Competition for recognition 
Breaking of an agreement 
Insults (overt/imagined) 
 
STAGE 1          
ENTERING 
Determined by: 
Behaviour 
Pressures 
Conflict experiences 
  
STAGE 5 
BEHAVIOUR & INTERACTION 
Initial behaviour determined by: 
Conceptualization 
Behaviour influences each other 
Interaction can increase or decrease the level of 
conflict 
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A conflict situation allows for individual conceptualization which in turn can influence 
the chances for a constructive outcome, the behaviours that will result, and the kinds 
of feelings that will be created during the conflict episode. Therefore it is important 
that the conceptualizations of an event be explored in the group (Mitchell, 2002). 
When trade union members take to the ballot box to give either their consent or 
refusal for participation in a strike or the continuation of a strike or if some form of 
agreement has been reached, for example a wage offer.   
 
• The fifth step is behaviour and interaction which can either lead to an increase or 
decreased in conflict since the initial behaviour is determined by 
conceptualization.  
 
• The sixth and final step in the conflict model is the outcome or result of the conflict 
episode. This outcome refers to the state of affairs that exists at the end of the 
episode, including decisions, actions taken, agreements made, and feelings of the 
participants.  
 
Subsequent episodes may occur, with similar or different issues. This process, as 
outlined by Mitchell (2002) repeated for each episode, with the outcome of previous 
episodes affecting the entering state of each party in subsequent episodes. 
Therefore, conflict escalation is a process that is triggered by a variety of factors, of 
which any can lead to conflict being resolved or not. 
 
However, the challenge should be to avoid the conflict in the first place, or to 
sensitize people to the mechanisms of conflict escalation. Such sensitizing may lead 
to a greater awareness of the steps one could take care to avoid if one wants to 
prevent a conflict from escalating out of control (Jordan, 1997). 
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Anstey created the following framework for a comprehension of the conflict 
escalation process (Anstey 1999, p. 37): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSUES   Limited issues                Issue proliferation 
 
DEMANDS       generalities, grandiose                                  
                                               all-encompassing demands 
 
RESOURCES  Limited investment of resources                           increasing investment of resources 
 
PARTICIPANTS   Few participants                                                   Formation of collectivities, alliances 
 
GOALS   Doing well                     Winning                           Hurting the other 
 
 
PERCEPTIONS  Non-evaluative                                                       Negative stereotyping ‘enemy’ 
                                                                                               perceptions’ Distortions 
 
 
COMMUNICATIONS Regular/open                                                         Infrequent/Selective information 
                                                                                                                               Induction 
 
 
RELATIONS  Positive/neutral                                                      Hostile 
 
 
INTERNAL ORGANISATION ‘Doves’ lead                                                          ‘Hawks’ 
                                 or balance                 Autocratic leadership 
                                 loose controls                                                        Conformity pressures 
                                                                                                               Task mobilization 
                                                                                                               High degree of organisation 
               
TACTICS   Problem                      Persuasion/               Threats                 Violence 
   solving /                      Inducements              Commitments 
   Ingratiation                                                    Disruption  
 
Figure 5 - Key elements of the conflict escalation process (Anstey, 1999) 
 
31 
 
Ruth (1994) in an analysis of the Port Elizabeth police strike in 1993 combined the 
existing conflict models of Anstey (1999) with that of Finnemore and Van der Merwe 
(1992) to arrive at a model that is useful for the analysis of strikes. Ruth’s model 
(Figure 6 on page 33) commences with the causes or aggravators and moderators, 
and advances to the strike process which includes the escalation of conflict. The 
model has its conclusion in the outcomes of the strike, which can be categorised into 
the immediate and long-term effects of the strike. The model will be presented yet 
again on page 101 since it will then provide a concise analysis of the strike.  
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Ruth (1994) presents the following model: 
   
 
  
 
AGGRAVATORS/MODERATORS   
                                  Trigger 
 
 
   
 Factors escalating conflict 
      
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
    De-escalation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - A conflict model for the analysis of strikes (Ruth, 1994) 
 
SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR 
CONFLICT ESCALATION  
ESCALATED CONFLICT 
CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR 
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Factors causing 
de-escalation 
33 
 
There is a close correlation between the conflicts models presented.  First; there is 
the presence of antecedent conditions that create opportunities for conflict to arise. 
However, not all sources of conflict trigger the development of conflict since these 
sources might be minimal and can be resolved at the starting point.  
 
The three strike models referred to in this treatise list the following sources of 
conflict:  
 
Anstey’s model: 
• Scarcity 
• Identity 
• Structural imbalance 
• Differing goals 
• Coordination 
• Ambiguity 
• Information 
• Interpersonals 
 
Thomas’ model, modified by Mitchell maintains that the sources of conflict are 
determined by:  
• Behaviour  
• Pressures 
• Conflict experiences 
• Previous episodes 
 
Ruth’s (1994, p. 29) combining the models of Anstey and Finnemore and Van der 
Merwe outlines the following sources of conflict as strike causes: 
 
• Anstey’s sources of conflict including the Aggravators and Moderators on those 
sources and; 
• The Trigger event that leads to conflict behaviour that is manifested in the form of 
a strike 
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The manifest behaviour is the action resulting from perceived and or felt conflict. At 
this stage, attempts are made to stifle the attempts of one party by the other.  
 
Typical conflict behaviour per model: 
 
Anstey (1999; 13) lists the following behaviour: 
• Violence 
• Coercion 
• Negotiation 
• Problem solving 
• Use of third parties 
• Litigation 
• Termination of relations 
 
Thomas (1976) states that initial conflict behaviour is determined by: 
• Conceptualization 
• Behaviour which influences each other 
• Interaction which can increase or decrease the level of conflict 
 
As mentioned earlier, Ruth (1994) used a combination of the Anstey and Finnemore 
and Van der Merwe’s models and, as such states that conflict behaviour is 
manifested in the process of the strike.  
 
The final part of the conflict seems to be influenced by interplay between overt 
conflict behaviour (the strike) and conflict handling strategies (as part of the conflict 
management process) such as collective bargaining in the public sector through the 
Public Service Collective Bargaining Council (PSCBC).  
 
Moreover, the outcome of the conflict influences the antecedent conditions and 
probability of future conflict. The aftermath sows the seeds of yet another conflict 
episode in which case the entire process is repeated. It can safely be said that public 
service unions remain to a large extent discontented after the strike, although unions 
signed the agreement ending the strike.  
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This chapter will conclude with a model for the analysis of strikes. This model will be 
elucidated against the backdrop of the causes, process and outcomes of the conflict 
escalation process.  
 
2.3. DISCUSSION OF FACTORS PRESENTED IN CONFLICT MODELS 
 
2.3.1. CONFLICT CAUSES 
 
Anstey (1999) outlines a number of conflict sources which will be briefly summarized: 
 
a) SCARCITY OF  RESOURCES 
 
Where there is competition over scarce resources political control is the means to 
economic power (Ruth, 1994). What has emerged in South Africa is that whereas the 
Nationalist government exercised political and economic control solely for the 
advancement of whites, the post- democratisation government has availed these 
resources through a process of employment equity and black economic 
empowerment. However, these concepts seem to be politically charged and suggest 
that it is seen as contributing factors to the increasing socio-economic divide. 
 
Moreover, whereas Ruth (1994) argues that in South Africa, the access to economic 
power has resulted in the traditional radical concept of class being confused with 
race, the class divisions in South Africa were indeed along racial lines stemming 
from calculated and overt efforts putting   whites in a superior position both 
economically and politically through the apartheid system. The resultant backlog and 
class differences would inevitably ensure that blacks would be the economically 
deprived class.  
  
In the same vein, Wallensteen (2004, p 16) when writing on the concept of conflict 
and the actors involved, comments that the notion of ‘an available set of resources’ 
should not be taken to include only economic factors. The term ‘resources’ covers all 
kinds of issues that are of interest to an actor.   
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b) STRUCTURAL IMBALANCES 
 
Structural imbalances occur where there is actual or perceived inequality of control 
of resources, ownership or resource distribution. Issues of power 
and authority is central, with dominant groups using their capacity for control to 
entrench a position of authority. Traditionally the home of the class debate, it is also 
the home of deep-rooted conflict (Anstey, 1999). 
 
Another definition is given by Brand et al., (1997) stating that structural matters rise 
between parties in a relationship where typical questions are: Who has the right to 
control what and whom? How is that control exercised? What resources are to be 
applied in a certain process, and how is that process to be structured?  
 
This concept, being expounded by Marxist theorists also suggests that industrial 
action which results from conflict can be attributed to economic deprivation which is 
a direct result of uneven income levels (salary negotiations),which in turn leads to 
class differences. The intensity of conflict in capitalist society was increased by the 
superimposition of authority and other factors of social status, especially income.  
 
The capitalist society’s imbalance of power is described when Dahrendorf (1959) 
argues that domination meant a high income for the capitalists, while labour is 
subjected to extreme hardship.  
 
c) DIFFERING GOALS 
 
People, either individually or in a group context, differs about the way they pursue a 
predetermined objective. In the industrial environment this can, for example, become 
manifest in divergent opinions between members of a workplace committee or forum 
on how to convey a complaint, a problem or a grievance to the management. In 
other words, although there is a clear objective – such as improved working 
conditions- the members of the committee or forum might not agree on the 
alternatives. 
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For example, are they to confront management and make concrete demands? Or 
should they negotiate and, if the negotiations are not successful, are they going to 
strike (Nel et al., 2005)?   
 
The elaborate citing in the preceding paragraph gives a clear example of how 
different objectives can cause a conflict to arise. Contributory is the point by Anstey 
(1999, p.24) when he writes that “an obvious source of conflict is reflected in 
relations in which parties are in pursuit of differing goals, a tension aggravated when 
they are interdependent in some way and when there is a scarce resource for which 
they are competing”.   
 
Consequently, conflict over the same goal which is desired by both relates first of all 
to the question of economic return and the distribution of disposable income between 
workers and manager-owners. However, it speedily becomes involved in the 
question of power. As each side sees it, an increase for one is a loss for the other 
(Stagner, 1956).  
 
d) DIVERGENT VALUE STRUCTURES 
 
In this type of conflict, the actual cause of the conflict relates to what the parties 
believe in, and how they feel about a certain matter: it is an essence a conflict about 
different values (Brand et al., 1997). 
 
From the above it can be deduced that having divergent goals does not necessarily 
imply that there are structural imbalances between the parties in a conflict situation. 
Moreover, it can be argued that mobilization is then not so much resource based, but 
that such mobilization will rather be value-based. 
 
In this regard, Ruth (1994) argues that in a society that displays cleavages between 
groups there is a high potential for conflict in that society, and that such conflict is 
often expressed in communal rather than class terms as it is easier to mobilize 
around communal markers than class arguments.  
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e) CO-ORDINATION 
 
As alluded to earlier, conflict is not only manifested between two diverging parties, 
but also between parties on a particular side. This ‘inter-union’ conflict arises when 
there are internal differences over how to pursue a particular objective. 
 
f) INFORMATION DIFFERENCES 
 
Since this work is based largely on media accounts of the strike, it is crucial to 
highlight information differences as a cause of conflict. Nel et al., (2005, p. 172) 
argues that the interpretation of information may be a cause of conflict, mainly 
because of the vast volume of information to which modern man is exposed. They go 
further and state that at different levels, the nature and extent of information 
available to groups may vary and this causes conflict that it is not so much the 
variety in available information that causes conflict, but rather the differences in 
interpretation. The deliberate withholding of information, as an offshoot of the 
availability of information, is also a major source of conflict.  
 
g) AMBIGUITY 
 
During periods of social change, uncertainty as to the boundaries of acceptable 
behaviour emerges, becoming not only the consequence but the cause of conflict. 
Previous modes of interaction may no longer be acceptable; traditional modes of 
exercising authority may be rejected; people may no longer be willing to continue 
leading or responding in a subservient manner (Anstey, 1999).  
Those that are in positions of control resort to out-dated methods in attempts to stifle 
any action; which leaves those agitating for change resorting to new levels of 
militancy. Often, this militancy escalates to overt conflict behaviour, which in turn 
holds the risk of destabilizing society.    
 
After examining some of the causes of conflict, it is vital to realize that conflict has its 
origin in an array of factors that need to be interrogated against the background of 
existing socio-economic and political conditions in both the country and organisation. 
Doing this creates a deeper understanding of the source of conflict, and could 
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indicate the direction of the conflict process.  
 
2.3.2 THE ROLE-PLAYERS INVOLVED 
 
a) The State / Management 
 
In the case of the Public Servants’ strike, the state occupies the role of management. 
Central to the state’s role in the conflict process, is how it views the public service 
unions; since this undoubtedly contributes to either the escalation or de-escalation of 
conflict. Moreover, since conflict outcomes are prone to recur in the employment 
relationship, the state’s view of unions is paramount to avert or contain future conflict 
episodes.  
 
Political attitudes can affect trade unionism in various ways. They can be reflected 
through the pursuit of economic policies, but most important they are shown in the 
legal framework within which trade unions have to operate. There is no case of a 
government permitting completely unregulated collective action. The attitude of a 
government can determine the role of trade unions by altering their functions (Allen 
(1978), in Barrett (ed.) 1980, p.60).  
 
The majority of public service unions in South Africa are affiliated to the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which is part of the tripartite alliance. The 
other two alliance members are the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP). These unions’ assimilation into the broader 
ruling alliance creates a situation where their legitimacy cannot be ignored, and 
where in fact their interests are represented in the highest echelons of power and 
policy making. 
 
The question remains however, whether such representation is significant and 
relates to real power for these unions? In this regard, Buhlungu and Psoulis (1999, 
p.125) argue that “support for the alliance has had a bearing on workers’ 
expectations and their assessment of the new government.”  
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On the contrary government could refuse the legitimacy of unions, which is not a 
wise strategy. Moreover, the way government engages with the unions is informed 
by an array of strategies that is employed at some point in the relationship as well as 
the conflict process.  
 
Within the South African context, the strategic position that the state would employ 
should be against the historical alliance between itself and the workers’ 
organisations. However, strategy can be changed so that certain issues can take 
precedence over loyalties. These issues range from economic policy matters to 
political issues; that given government’s market oriented stance does not carry the 
approval of the constituencies which support government.  
 
b) The Union 
 
Not all union objectives, however justifiable and reasonable these objectives might 
be, are a guarantee of management’s acknowledgement. In instances like these the 
potential for conflict is high. Given the fact that the struggles of the 1980s created the 
platform for the democratic transition in 1994, workers and their unions who saw 
their contributions as significant, the expectation is created that matters economic 
and labour will now enter an improved period. Where a society or relationship are in 
a process of transition, traditional norms are commonly weakened giving rise to 
greater aspiration levels on the part of groups hoping for dramatic improvements in 
their status, power or access to scarce resources (Anstey, 1999).  
 
At this point the union could also very well find themselves in a position where the 
levels of solidarity are high and there exists an agreement on how goals should be 
achieved. However, the contrary can also be the case where discord between union 
members or federation affiliates lead to friction. However, an interesting observation 
is made by Von Holdt (2002) when he writes that “the disintegration of political and 
trade union struggle diluted the militancy and solidarity of workers”. 
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In instances where there indeed exists a workable relationship between the state 
and unions, and there seems to be agreement on the extent of issues that would be 
bargained on, conflict diminishes or the threat thereof is considerably less than in an 
environment where there is a history of distrust and hostility.  
 
c) The Community 
 
South Africa in the 1980s saw a new level of unity within the ranks of the labour 
movement. Wood (2002) argues that “in the eighties, the independent trade unions 
played a central role in the opposition to the apartheid government.” He continues 
and says that “this resulted in increasing linkages with the community.” The notion 
that workplace and communities’ struggles were in fact inseparable was reinforced 
(Knowles, 2001, p.2).  The levels of interdependence between the community and 
the labour movement were necessitated by the climate of persecution. 
 
Similarly, Von Holdt (2002, p. 287) notes that “the relationship between trade unions 
and political and community organisations was not so much an alliance between 
autonomous organisations with specific common interests as an interpenetration of 
movements , a complex and dynamic network of political, community and workplace 
struggles woven together by a discourse of national liberation struggle.”  
 
 
In addition media reports surfaced that solidarity strikes would also occur more 
frequently, as did the threats that the metal industry union, the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) threatened to do in support of the Public 
Servants’ strike. However, in as much as there are displays of solidarity and 
cohesion; this does not necessarily secure the support of the community at large, 
and one would find that the community involvement can either be a moderator or 
aggravator of conflict.  
 
Once again, from a strategic point of view, approval for the unions from the 
community and conversely, condemnation for the strike would put these two 
protagonists in two conflicting positions, which would either aggravate or alleviate the 
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conflict, since the challenge now becomes renewed and sustained efforts from the 
union to legitimise its industrial action, especially should such action be a protracted 
strike that has an impact on, for instance service delivery. The government would at 
this point continue to discredit unions and reduce their efforts to that of being 
irresponsible, unreasonable and counter-productive. 
 
d) The Media 
 
The media is a strategic tool used by both parties (Ruth, 1994). In some strikes the 
presentation of the opposing arguments, both to employees and to the public, 
became a crucial factor in deciding the final outcome. Several nationalized industries 
challenged the industrial strength of the trade unions by attempting to manage the 
way the news was reported, and on occasion this process revealed the extent of 
government involvement, as ministers were forced to take their place at the very 
forefront of the battle for publicity (Jones, 1986). 
 
Another remark is made by Hyman (1989) when he states that “the role of the news 
media in forming public opinion is very important; research has detected an element 
of bias in the reporting of strikes”. At this point, images of Ministers Geraldine Fraser-
Moleketi (Public Service), Trevor Manuel (Finance), Manto Tshabalala Msimang 
(Health) and Naledi Pandor (Education) jointly addressing the media on national 
television at the height of the strike influencing public opinion is evoked.  
 
Thus, there are underlying moderators or aggravators that have a bearing on the 
conflict sources and that can either lead to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict.  
 
The next section will now provide a brief outline, in point form of the causes and 
triggers of a strike, conflict escalation and de-escalation and the outcomes of the 
conflict process.  
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2.3.3. THE CAUSES OF A STRIKE 
 
Strikes have their origin in the economic and/or political environment in which 
workers find themselves. In the South African context, serious perceptions of 
deprivation exist among employees (Finnemore & van Rensburg, 1999).  
 
Conflict may exist latently or manifest overtly at every level of industrial relations. 
The overt forms of conflict are various and include absenteeism, sabotage, go-slows, 
work-to-rule, restriction, and industrial action, the primary focus of this work, such as 
strikes, lock-outs and boycotts 
 
With regards to causes of strikes Knowles (1952) (as cited in Hyman 1991, p. 120) 
provides the following points as causes of strikes: 
 
• BASIC: wages, hours, bread and butter issues 
• SOLIDARITY: recognition, closed shop, picket lines 
• FRICTIONAL: working arrangements, discipline, redundancy 
 
However, strikes do not simply explode into life, but are purposeful withdrawals of 
labour by a production unit (Bendix et al., 1988). They are often motivated by 
“justifiable” reasons, and at the time, are perceived usually to be the most 
appropriate and effective form of response to a frustrated situation (Waddington, 
1986).  
 
2.3.4. CONFLICT ESCALATION  
 
At some point, the conflict which is such an integral part of our social relationships 
simply becomes too much. At this point the level of conflict becomes unbearable, 
and can no longer be tolerated. This is the pivotal trigger point, and it represents a 
major step in the transformation process 
(Brand et al., 1997, p.7).  
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Anstey (1999) identifies the following key elements of conflict escalation: 
 
• Issues and demands: There is a proliferation of issues and demands as the 
conflict grows. 
 
• Communications: Misperceptions are reinforced through poor communication 
resulting from communication channels not being used or abused by either party. 
This in turn enhances conflict.  
 
• Mutual perceptions: Schein observes that as hostilities between groups increase 
and communications decrease, so it becomes easier to develop and maintain 
negative stereotypes. 
 
• Shifts in tactics: As conflict increases a shift away from problem-solving, 
persuasion and conciliation toward an increased reliance on strategies of power 
and the utilization of tactics and coercion, threat and deception, a belief emerges 
that the solution to the conflict is only attainable via force or trickery. 
 
What is more, a shift in tactics also coincides with an increase of power as the 
conflicting parties tend to maximize negative stereotypes of the other Anstey 
(1999) maintains that usual norms of inter group conduct come to be regarded as 
inapplicable, and moral norms are lowered in terms of the adversarial interaction.  
 
• Group changes: Relations between groups in conflict are characterised by the 
emergence of enemy perceptions, increased hostility and distrust, breakdowns in 
communication and selective information induction (Schein, 1985, in Anstey, 
1999). Group dynamics change influencing relationships between members and 
that of members towards leaders in the group. Where there might be differences 
in reaching goals and modus operandi, these differences are put on hold, while 
there is an increase in loyalty and solidarity.  
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Within groups however, conflict can also be escalated since an increase in 
polarisation contributes to mistrust and communication breakdowns. In order for 
groups to maintain their cohesiveness, a change in leadership might be required, 
and, as Anstey (1999) notes, groups involved in heavy conflict assume a more 
militant leadership, cantering on individuals who hold strong adversarial attitudes and 
skills. 
 
• Community polarisation: As escalation of conflict occurs it becomes difficult for 
communities to remain uninvolved. Moreover, as was mentioned earlier in the 
chapter that the trend is that shop floor struggles frequently spill over to 
community struggles, which increases levels of solidarity. As the conflict escalates 
and as the public servants’ strike indicated, when the strike becomes protracted, 
then the community tends to reconsider its support (Ruth, 1994).  
 
The following factors stem from the causes of conflict and leads to an escalation of 
conflict. This section will briefly list these processes that promote escalation as a 
result of poorly handled conflicts.  
 
a) Gratification: An increase in pressure as part of the tactical armoury of a 
party causes a sense of gratification. Some groups identities are 
rooted in their adversarial roles, in this atmosphere, a shift to a co-operative, 
problem solving approach may imply loss of identity for the group and loss of 
leadership roles for some (Anstey, 1999).  
 
b) Entrapment: There is the possibility that parties can become confined in a 
certain position, especially since these positions have been justified. This 
results in the conflicting parties focusing attention and energy to the cause at 
all cost and as Anstey (1999) notes that as various authors have argued, such 
conflicts are often protracted, and extending long beyond the immediacy of 
any moment … each such incident serves to entrap the parties further into 
long-term tensions. 
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c) Provocation: One side may provoke the other into escalation to make it 
behave in a ‘reprehensible’ manner. In this way it might gain internally and in 
terms of external relations as a consequence of the conflict process (Anstey, 
1999).  
 
d) Leadership and control structures: Poor leadership especially when it 
comes to timing in the conflict escalation process results in groups being 
placed in a disadvantaged position. Not only does the lack of leadership and 
control over those that it represent indicate a lack of forethought, and in some 
cases some leaders require ongoing conflict with external forces to maintain 
internal control and unity (Anstey, 1999).  
 
e) Group changes: There exists a possibility that as group changes come to the 
fore, then abilities become lesser to become aware of behaviour that signals a 
desire to de-escalate the process. 
 
2.3.5. DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICT 
 
Anstey delivers the following brief presentation on de-escalating conflict: 
 
 
Figure 7 - De-escalation of conflict (Anstey, 2004) 
 
 
De-escalating conflicts 
 
      
Causes of stalemate & de-escalation 
     Failure of contentious tactics 
     Loss of capital support 
     Unacceptable costs 
A ‘hurting stalemate’   Plateaus & precipices 
Internal division   
 Organisational conservatism: survival 
     New relations between adversaries 
     Coercion 
     Third party intervention  
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a) Competition for group leadership/internal division: If conflict is prolonged, 
it could more arduous to ‘sell’ its legitimacy, especially in the wake of efforts 
by the opposition to ‘reach out’ and be reasonable. This was  the case in the 
public servants’ strike since unions were portrayed as unreasonable by the 
government, especially since the media seem to have portrayed almost 
exclusively the wage demands, and to a lesser extent the other issues. 
 
Herein lies the danger for groups since there will be those leaders who will 
begin to agitate for a relinquishing of the current position and adopting a more 
conciliatory approach as opposed to the hardliners who would persist and 
intensify current action. This in itself leads to internal division since the 
competition for leadership. 
 
b) Organisational conservatism: While conflict may produce group cohesion, 
identity and mobilization, it could also threaten the very existence of a group. 
Struggle groups may be less willing to engage in, or continue conflict that 
threatens their existence (Ruth, 1994).  
 
c) New relationships between adversaries: During a conflict opposing groups 
may develop respect for and understanding of each other and move from 
open confrontation to procedural conduct of the relationship (Ruth, 1994). 
Regular negotiation and pressure exchanges may contribute to the skills of 
leaders in reading each other’s power capacities, needs and pressures, thus 
promoting the possibilities that one or both will take steps to de-escalate the 
conflict at critical points (Anstey, 1999).  
 
d) Coercion: Coercion may see de-escalation by the other side for two reasons. 
Firstly, it may physically prevent the other side from continuing its conflict 
behaviour, obliging de-escalation owing to a reduced capacity (Anstey, 1999). 
Secondly, coercion might also entail that one party might make use of 
ultimatums as a threat and in so doing lead the other party to question its 
stance in the wake of the ultimatums, thus calculating the cost, which in most 
cases are dire,  
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 of prolonging the conflict versus the consequence of not adhering to an 
ultimatum.  
  
e) Third-party intervention: Efforts of independent mediators may exert 
pressure on the conflicting parties to relinquish their positions and to reach 
common ground in the resolution of the conflict.  
Alternatively, as Anstey ( 
 
(1991, as cited in Ruth, 1994 ) argues, “non-
involvement of third parties may limit the expansion of conflict by limiting the 
resources and support of the parties”  
2.3.6. OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT 
 
Conflict models examined have multiple terms for this phase of the conflict 
process. Finnemore and Van der Merwe (1992) describe these outcomes as 
immediate and long-term outcomes. Anstey (1999) refers to these outcomes as 
residual effects.  
 
These remaining effects can be either positive or negative, and in many cases 
remain dormant to manifest itself at some stage after the conflict. This outcome 
also includes decisions, actions taken, agreements made, and feelings of the 
participants.  
 
Mullins (2007) lists the following typical positive and negative outcomes of 
conflict:  
 
POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT 
• Better ideas are produced 
• People are forced to search for new approaches 
• Long-standing problems are brought to the surface and resolved 
• Clarification of individual views 
• Stimulation of interest and creativity 
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• A chance for people to test their  capacities 
 
NEGATIVE OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT 
• Some people feel defeated and demeaned  
• The distance between people increased 
• A climate of mistrust and suspicion developed 
• Individuals and groups concentrate on their own narrow interests 
• Resistance developed rather than teamwork 
• An increase in employee turnover 
 
Other immediate outcomes on the legal front may be dismissal of workers which 
could in turn lead to unfair labour practices being alleged (Finnemore & Van der 
Merwe, 1992). The repercussions for the union might be disillusionment with the 
leadership and direction of the union as well as the political lineage of the union, 
which leads to a decline in membership, and the union loosening bargaining power. 
Other effects could be the attainment of goals, albeit through relinquishing former 
demands in order to reach a compromise, or unions could be, as Jordan (1997) puts 
it, ‘annihilated’.  
 
The long-term effects of conflict could result in damaged relationships that are 
difficult to resurrect. Moreover, a long term effect that stems from negative 
immediate outcomes necessitates a rethink of power balance in the relationship.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION: ANALYTIC MODEL OF CONFLICT   
 
After having explained the various causes, processes and outcomes of conflict, it is 
imperative to indicate that the model that will be used for the analysis of the Public 
Servants strike is that of Ruth (1994) illustrated as figure 5 in the preceding 
discussion. This model will form the framework for the analysis and discussion in 
chapters 4 and 5.  
 
In the final analysis, it can be argued that in order to understand conflict it is 
imperative to comprehend that conflict is a convoluted process that requires 
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thorough interrogation. From its sources and causes, triggers and the escalation or 
de-escalation, the conflict needs to be analysed in order to mange the conflict 
processes to arrive at outcomes that are positive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
From chapter 2 it should be quite clear how important the management of conflict is, 
since it can, if not managed properly escalate and damage the collective 
employment relationship.  The preceding chapter maintained that conflict is 
generated by a variety of causes including economic, ideological, socio-cultural and 
personal differences between people. 
 
In this context, the aim of this chapter is to examine collective bargaining in the 
public sector prior to 1995 as well as post-1995 which saw a more democratic labour 
relations dispensation in South Africa. Moreover, it will focus on collective bargaining 
structures in South Africa’s public sector where later parts of this chapter will focus 
on the practice of ‘social dialogue’ in the South African Public Service. 
 
The public servants’ strike was also characterised by the participation of trade unions 
representing professions that are declared as essential services and for which strike 
action was illegal. It is against this backdrop that this chapter will also focus on 
agreements pertaining to these professions. 
 
3.2 A BACKGROUND TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SOUTH 
     AFRICA’S PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
The following broad explanations of collective bargaining are given: 
 
Bendix (1996, p. 249-250) comprehensively describes collective bargaining as 
follows: 
A process, necessitated by a conflict of needs, interests, goals, values, 
perceptions and ideologies, but resting on a basic commonality of interest, 
whereby employees/employee collectives and employers/employer 
collectives, by the conduct of continued negotiation and the application of 
pressure and counter pressure, attempt to achieve some balance between the 
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fulfilment of the needs, goals and interests of management on the one hand 
and employees on the other- the extent to which either party achieves its 
objectives depending on the nature of the relationship itself, each party’s 
source and use of power, the power balance between them, the 
organisational and strategic effectiveness of each party, as well as the type of 
bargaining structure and the prevalent economic, socio-political and other 
conditions (pp. 249-250) 
  
From a legislative point, collective bargaining lies at the heart of the South African 
Labour Relations Act (No 66 of 1995) and is regarded as central to the defence and 
advancement of workers interests in their relationship with employees. Chapter 3 of 
the LRA makes extensive provision for protecting and advancing workers’ rights 
through a bundle of mechanisms including workplace organizational rights, collective 
agreements, bargaining councils, (sector/area bargaining councils, public service 
bargaining councils and statutory councils) and ministerial determinations (Ndungu, 
2007). 
 
Collective bargaining is traditionally the primary interaction process between labour 
and management. The process of collective bargaining therefore serves the interests 
of the individual workers through agreements that are struck to better serve and 
satisfy the needs of the workers. However, since individual needs are often in 
conflict, one function of collective bargaining is to formulate compromises for 
conflicting individual interests. 
 
Collective bargaining is a process in which representatives of labour and 
representatives of the employer (management) negotiate and otherwise interact in 
an attempt to reach agreements and to uphold these agreements regarding matters 
that relate to or may impact on the employment relationship. The collective concept 
thus indicates that these are representatives who speak for the groups which they 
represent (Nel et al., 2005).  
 
Societal changes and/or expectations as well as competitive demands place a 
greater emphasis on the need for government, labour (employees) and employers to 
be “social partners” in a co-operative effort to promote economic development and 
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survival, social justice, labour peace and workplace democratisation. This can only 
be achieved through collective bargaining and joint decision-making processes, 
leading to the final adoption of fair collective agreements (Swanepoel, 2002).  
 
The preceding paragraph emphasized the importance of stakeholders to engage 
each other collectively for their own survival, and as Solo (1997, p. 143) argues, 
collective bargaining “underscores the contention that there is more security of 
employment in circumstances where an employee is allowed to join a union and 
within that union to bargain collectively with others.” 
 
Solo (1997), in his comparative study of industrial relations in the public service 
between Botswana and South Africa, further argues that as  
International Labour Organisation standards are intended to be universal, they 
should then apply to and be attainable by countries with diverging structures and at 
all states of industrial development. He further maintains that the question of 
unionization, whether in the public or private sector is ‘inextricably linked, if not part 
of the broader fundamental human right called freedom of association’. This is 
enshrined in clause 18 of the Bill of Rights in the Final Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa which makes provision for freedom of association.  
 
 
3.3 A BACKGROUND TO LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
      PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
In 1994 through an Act of Parliament, the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) was set up as a quadripartite social dialogue institution 
consisting of representatives of organised business, organised labour, organised 
community organisations (civil society) and the State. NEDLAC considers all 
proposed legislation to labour market policy before it gets tabled in Parliament 
(Huluman, 2005). Patel (as cited in Huluman, 2005), argues that public service 
collective bargaining in South Africa is woven into the general political and labour 
relations fabric of the country.  
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Of course this was not always the case, as Patel further argues that the political 
system of apartheid ‘fragmented public service labour relations. So what did the 
labour landscape of the public service look like prior to democratisation? 
 
Prior to 1993, the labour relations framework of the South African public service was 
limited in scope; public servants had no labour rights, no right to organize into trade 
unions or to bargain collectively. Although the need for the involvement of employees 
in the determination of wages and working conditions was raised in the early 1920s, 
no public servants were to form trade unions or bargain collectively (Huluman 2005; 
Grawitsky 2007). 
 
Prior to 1994, South Africa reflected eleven governments and four provincial 
administrations. In addition to the former Republic of South Africa, 
there were four ‘independent’ states, namely Transkei, Botswana, Venda and Ciskei 
(former TBVC) and six self-governing territories (SGTs). Each had its own body of 
statutes and laws regulating matters within its legal competence, including labour 
relations. 
 
Public Service Unions were formed along racial lines with the Public Service 
Association (PSA) for whites being formed in 1920.  The Public Service Union (PSU) 
was established for Indian public servants, the Institute for Public Servants (IPS) for 
the African employees and the Public Service League (PSL) for Coloured 
employees. The State as employer was not obliged to respond or even consider 
these recommendations when making decisions around conditions of service. 
 
While the apartheid government sought to expand the role of employee 
organisations, only these racially based staff associations were granted recognition 
and included in the consultative structures (Huluman, 2005, p 2).  
 
The mid 1980s witnessed militant struggles by organisations such as the National 
Education, Health and Allied Worker’s Union (NEHAWU) and Health Workers Union 
(HWU) for recognition and fully-fledged collective bargaining. The exclusion of 
progressive unions in the consultative structures rendered them ineffective.  
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In 1988, after several years of consultation and growing pressure from a wide range 
of employee organisations, in particular the efforts of COSATU through the ILO the 
government committed itself to collective bargaining. 
 
During the early 1990s the Joint Advisory Council, representative of all white public 
service employees, and established during the late 1960s by the Nationalist 
government to advise the Minister for Public Service on human resource matters, 
extended invitations to the associations and other unions linked to the democratic 
forces to make inputs on conditions of service and other matters. This, however, did 
not take the form of negotiations.  
 
This period was also an era of bitter struggles in the labour movement for recognition 
of union organisation. This spilt over into the public service, where labour unrest and 
industrial action increased, particularly in the health and education sectors. The 
result of this was the passing of a number of laws and regulations to deal with labour 
relations in the public service. The Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA) and the 
Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) were passed in 1993.  
 
The PSLRA of 1993 for the first time provided for full labour rights in the public 
service. Public service employees now had the right organize into trade 
unions or associations, right to collectively bargain and the right to strike. The 
Act also provided for an unfair labour practice definition. With regard to 
collective bargaining, the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) 
established a sector specific bargaining council for educators, the Education 
Labour Relations Council (ELRC).  
 
The functions of these bargaining structures were similar to those performed 
by the old industrial councils and conciliation boards, and can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• Dispute prevention: To prevent disputes from arising 
• Dispute resolution: To settle disputes that have arisen or may arise 
• Regulation of settlement of matters of mutual interest through negotiation 
(Huluman, 2005: 3).  
56 
 
 
Labour unrest in the police and prison departments in the early 1990s led to 
the passing of the South African Police Labour Regulations in 1995. These  
regulations established the National Negotiation Forum in 1995 for the South 
African Police.  
 
Marks (2002, p. 1) outlines the following positive spin-offs of the involvement 
of the police unions in determining conditions of work: 
 
• It fosters co-operative relations between police workers, police managers and 
police employers; 
• It provides police with the opportunity to participate in determining the 
conditions of their daily working lives and thus builds morale and commitment 
to the service; and thirdly 
• Collective bargaining between police managers/employers and police workers 
also serves to weaken the traditionally militaristic and autocratic nature of police 
administration.  
 
3.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR RELATIONS ACT, 1995 AND THE PUBLIC     
      SERVICE 
 
The demise of the apartheid government in 1994, and the arrival of democracy 
resulted in fundamental legislative changes, but as Hassan (2005) maintains, the 
following apartheid inheritance first had to be tackled: 
• Fragmentation 
• Pay determination without negotiations 
• Discrimination 
• Career systems structured for long service 
The promulgation of the LRA in 1995 radically altered the system of labour relations 
in the public service, since this sector was now covered by the same provisions as 
the broader workforce. Moreover, there was also more inclusivity, as Lawrence 
(2004) notes that “the Labour Relations Act represented the first national labour 
legislation whose formulation included the participation of the major labour 
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federations (COSATU and NACTU) as well as major employers’ association 
(including the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs, or 
SACCOLA)”.  
 
The LRA stipulates: 
23       (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Every worker has the right- (a) to form and join a union; (b) to 
participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; 
and (c) to strike. 
(3) Every employer has the right – (a) to form and join an employer’s 
organisation; and (b) to participate in the activities of an employer’s 
organisation. 
(4) Every trade union and every employer’s organisation has the right – 
(a) to determine its own administration, programme and activities; (b) to 
organize, (c) to bargain collectively, and (d) to form and join a 
federation. 
(5) The provisions of the Bill of Rights do not prevent legislation 
recognizing union security arrangements contained in collective 
agreements. 
 
The LRA aligns South Africa’s labour relations framework with that of the rest of the 
developed world. Chapter 2 of the Act deals with freedom of Association. It 
guarantees freedom of association for all workers within its scope. Similar freedom of 
association rights are provided for an employer.  
 
This guarantee of freedom of association is in line with the Universal declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Labour Organisation Convention no. 
87 and 98 on the right to form and belong to a trade union and to bargain collectively 
in order to protect ones interests. 
 
The LRA applies to all workers with the exception of the National Defence Force 
(NDF), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the South African Secret Service 
(SASS). These institutions constitute essential services and it would be inappropriate 
to extend the application of the LRA to them. For an even stronger reason public 
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defence and safety would appear to militate against these institutions being 
accorded rights under the LRA.  
 
Public servants in South Africa are therefore permitted to organize themselves into 
unions and to bargain collectively. This is in accordance with the labour provisions in 
the new constitution and the new LRA. The underlying thrust of the LRA is towards 
voluntary centralized collective bargaining- within an industrial sector. The Public 
Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) coordinates collective bargaining 
within the public sector (Solo 1997; ILO manual).  
 
 
3.5 PUBLIC SERVICE BARGAINING COUNCILS  
 
The provisions of the LRA allow trade unions and employer bodies to form 
bargaining councils for collective bargaining purposes. It is the interaction between 
these parties that gives practical effect to the social dialogue objectives of labour 
legislation (Mgijima, 2003).  
 
Sections 35 to 38 of the LRA specify the collective bargaining structures for the 
public sector. The PSCBC determines most issues centrally. Simultaneously, the 
collective bargaining structures that had been created for educators, the Education 
Labour Relations Council (ELRC), for police the National Negotiating Forum (NNF), 
the national departments and the provincial administrations continued to exist.  
 
The LRA effectively created 36 bargaining councils in the public sector, since the 
LRA also entrenched the departmental and provincial bargaining chambers in that 
these chambers were deemed to be sectoral bargaining councils in their own right; a 
status that they never previously enjoyed. 
 
In an effort to create a more structured collective bargaining environment, the 
PSCBC (in terms of section 138 of the LRA) designated four sectors for the 
establishment of sectoral bargaining councils. 
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The designated sectors are: 
 
• The Public Health and Welfare Sectoral Bargaining Council (PHWBC) 
 
The existence of the Public Health and Social Development Sectoral 
Bargaining Council (PHSDSBC) which was formerly known as the Public 
Health and Welfare Sectoral Bargaining Council (PHWBC) up until the change 
of name in 2007 can be traced back to the LRA No. 66 of 1995, Section 37. 
The PHSDSBC encompasses the State as employer, and its employees who 
fall within the registered scope of the PSCBC, namely:  
 
• Employers and employees employed in: 
-The Department of Health in the national sphere of government; 
-The nine departments of health in the provincial sphere of government; 
-The Department of Social Development in the national sphere of government; 
-The nine departments of social development in the provincial sphere of 
government. 
 
All other employees, who are employed in health and social development 
facilities under the Public Service Act and the Correctional Services Act; and 
their employers; and other health and social department workers, as defined in 
schedule 1 of the PHSDSBC Constitution and employed under the Public 
Service Act, and their employers (Public Service Bargaining Councils, 2008).  
 
• The Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC)* 
The SSSBC was established according Resolution 12/98 of the PSCBC. The 
SSSBC is a result of the amalgamation of the National Negotiating Forum 
(NNF) and the Department of Safety and Security Bargaining Council. The 
State is the employer and its employees in the South African Police Service in 
terms of: 
-The South African Police Service Act 
-The Public Service Act 
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The Parties to the Council are 
-South African Police Services (SAPS) 
-South African Police Union (SAPU) 
-Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) 
 
• The Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC)* 
 
-Employer 
Representing the state as an employer is the collective made up of the 
Provincial Departments of Education co-ordinated by the national Department 
of Education. 
-Trade Unions 
South African Democratic Teacher’s Union (SADTU) 
National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOSA) 
Suid-Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie (SAOU) 
National Teachers Union (NATU) 
(Education Labour Relations Council, 2008) 
 
• The General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council (GPSSBC)* 
 
The GPSSBC is designated as a Sectoral Council in terms of the LRA 66/1995 
as amended sections 35 and 37. The scope of the GPSSBC covers all National 
Departments and Provincial Administrations not covered by the Scope of the 
PHWSBC, SSSBC (Public Service Bargaining Councils ). , 2008
 
In terms of collective agreements, it must be noted though that some of the collective 
agreements that were signed in the old Departmental Bargaining Councils are still in 
force. Disputes pertaining to the interpretation and/or application of these 
agreements can however not be referred to the PSCBC or the Sectoral Councils. 
Disputes pertaining to these agreements must thus be referred to the Commission 
for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), unless the PSCBC or the relevant 
sectoral bargaining council has ratified the agreement. 
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The following diagram illustrates the current collective bargaining structures in the 
public service: 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The current collective bargaining structures in the Public 
Sector (Retrieved from: (http://www.pscbc.org.za
 
). 
 
The PSCBC thus plays a co-ordinating role between the various bargaining councils 
in sectors of the public service, of which the following main objectives are crucial: 
• To prevent and resolve labour disputes within the public service; 
• Perform dispute resolution functions as outlined in section 51 of the LRA. 
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Moreover, the scope of the PSCBC is as follows: 
The whole public service as defined in Section 1(1) of the Public Service Act, 1994, 
(promulgated by Proclamation No. 103 of 1994) but excluding- 
(a) members of the National Defence Force; 
(b) members of the National Intelligence Agency; and 
(c) members of the South African Secret Service. 
 
The objectives of the PSCBC are as follows: 
 
The objectives of the Council, within its registered scope, are to: 
• generally enhance labour peace in the public service; 
• promote a sound relationship between the employer and its employees; 
• in terms of the Act and this constitutions, negotiate and bargain collectively to 
reach agreement on matters of mutual interest to the employer and employees 
represented by admitted trade unions in the Council; 
• provide mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of disputes between- 
I. the employer and trade unions admitted to Council; 
II. the employer and trade unions not admitted to the Council; and 
III. the employer and employees; where the employer has the requisite 
authority to resolve such disputes; 
• conclude, supervise and enforce collective agreements; 
• comply with its powers and duties in terms of the Act and this constitution;  
• consider and deal with such other matters as may affect the interests of the 
parties to the Council; and 
• Promote effective communication and co-ordination between the Council and 
sectors designated in terms of clause 21.3 of the Constitution.  
  
The PSCBC deals with disputes that arise in the Council between admitted parties, 
and/or non-admitted parties who fall within the registered scope of the Council. The 
PSCBC deals mainly with collective disputes that affect two or  
more sectors and/or parties in terms of section 36 of the Act. 
 If a sectoral bargaining council has the requisite jurisdiction over the issue in 
dispute, then the PSCBC does not have the jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. 
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Moreover, the dispute settlement mechanism in the PSCBC has a conciliation stage 
with a standing panel of Conciliators.  
 
 
 
There is a code of conduct for conciliators and arbitrators that is meant to guard 
against bias and unfairness and unscrupulous behaviour. The PSCBC has also been 
accredited by the CCMA to arbitrate on matters. Any of the parties can, after 
arbitration, take its case to the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court (Mgijima, 
2003). 
 
The following table on page 67 provides a detailed synopsis of the Bargaining 
Councils under the PSCBC as well as professions and/or national government 
departments that fall under each. Huluman (2005) identifies the following 
parties to the PSCBC: 
 
 
1. Employer 
 
The State as employer is represented by the Chief Negotiator from the Department 
of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). The employer’s negotiating team also 
consists of chief negotiators from sector bargaining councils, representatives from 
national departments and representatives of provincial administrations in the public 
service. The Chief Negotiator convenes an employer caucus, called the Labour 
Relations Forum (LRF), on a monthly basis to prepare for the collective bargaining 
process. The total delegation of the employer representation in Council is thirty five. 
 
2. Management authority 
 
 
Management authority in the public service from 1 July 1999, when the new Public 
Service Regulations came into effect, is no longer as centrally organised as it was 
under the previous legislative framework. However, managerial power has only 
been decentralized in relation to human resource management and even these 
powers are limited. Managers do not have the power to determine pay and 
conditions for their departments or provincial administrations. 
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The authority to determine pay and other conditions of service is vested in the 
Minister of Public Service and Administration, the Minister of Education and the 
Minster of Safety and Security at the national level. As result of the central 
managerial authority, collective bargaining is centralized.  
 
 
3. Labour 
 
In the past, the PSCBC chamber consisted of 19 employee organisations that were 
admitted to the bargaining forum as a result of an admission threshold of 1000 
members. In the initial stages of setting up a new democratic labour relations system 
and in the interest of collectivism, this ensured the inclusion of the majority of 
stakeholders, representing workers from different geographical and racial groupings.  
 
 
The PSCBC constitution registered in 1997 set a threshold of 20 000 members as 
an admission requirement. Two percent of the public service. Unions however are 
allowed to act together to make up the necessary membership. The acting together 
arrangement also ensured the inclusion of the founding parties. During the period 
June 1998-June 2003, 12 trade unions were admitted to the Council. 
 
 
 
 
The amended Constitution registered on 31 May 2003 set a new threshold of 50 000 
members, 5 percent of the public service. This is a relatively low representatively 
requirement, as compared to the private sector where representatively is set at 
around 20 percent. Currently there are 8 trade unions admitted to the PSCBC 
(Huluman, 2005).  
 
A comprehensive table containing full names of unions as well as the federations 
that they are affiliated to is presented in table 4 which includes membership totals of 
affiliates.  
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Table 1: Trade unions admitted to the PSCBC as at July 2005 (Membership 
figures as at 31 December 2004). 
UNION VOTE 
WEIGHT 
MEMBERS
HIP 
 
DENOSA acting together  with SAMA 
 
5. 855% 
 
57 950 
 
HOSPERSA/NUPSAW/NATU acting together 
 
10.551% 
 
104 426 
APEK, ITUSA, NUE, OFSATA, PEU, SAOU, SAUVSE, USAPE, acting together as 
NAPTOSA 
 
8. 606% 
 
85 177 
 
NEHAWU acting together with PAWUSA 
 
16.491 
 
163 217 
 
POPCRU acting together with SASAWU and SADNU 
 
10. 797% 
 
106 864 
 
PSA acting together with UNIPSA and NPSWU 
 
18. 022% 
 
178 367 
 
SADTU acting together with CTPA 
 
23. 137% 
 
228 986 
 
SAPU  
 
6. 540% 
 
64 727 
 
(The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service, Huluman, 2005)  
 
 
Over 90 percent of public service employees belong to trade unions admitted to the 
PSCBC, and 20 percent belong to more than one trade union. The ideological 
background and political affiliations of employees determine trade union membership 
in the public service; however in recent years employees tend to join other trade 
unions which can offer individual services (i.e. representation in grievance and 
dispute procedures, and other financial services). The high dual/triple union 
membership can be attributed to these factors and the high rate of organised 
workers was facilitated through the agency shop agreement entered into by the 
parties to the PSCBC (Huluman, 2005). 
 
3.6 ESSENTIAL AND MAINTENANCE SERVICES 
 
Essential services remain a bone of contention between unions and the state 
(Ndungu, 2007). Essential services are defined as those services whose interruption 
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would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the 
population.  
 
The LRA, although protecting striking workers’ freedom of association and permitting 
strike action over matters of mutual interest, such matters must not: 
• Be subject to arbitration 
• Be in breach of a collective agreement 
• A person is not engaged in an essential service or maintenance service 
(Lagrange, 2009 p 7).  
 
The LRA does not provide a specific list of essential services but provision is made 
by the LRA to clarify whether services are essential or not by the appointment of an 
Essential Services Committee (ESC). In this regard Lagrange (2009, p 7) states that 
this three person ESC may: 
• Investigate and determine if a service, or part of it, is an essential service 
• Vary or cancel previous designations 
• Decide disputes about whether or not a service is an essential service or whether 
or not an employer/employee is engaged in an essential service 
 
Moreover, 
• The ESC may also ratify a collective agreement providing for the maintenance of 
minimum services in a service designated as an essential service; 
• The agreed minimum services are to be regarded as an essential service in 
respect of the employer and its employees; 
• The provisions of section 74 (providing for compulsory arbitration) do not apply 
 
For example, if a strike is very lengthy or is characterised by violence, that sector 
can be declared as essential service. The only two exceptions are the South African 
Police Services and the parliamentary service for reasons of policy (Nel et al., 2005: 
209).  
 
On the limits on strikes as it pertains to essential services, Hassen (2001) further 
argues that essential services agreements were constructed at a time when 
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government and progressive trade unions saw themselves as part of a ‘coalition for 
transformation’. Since then bargaining has become more adversarial. Vavi (1997), 
four years earlier pointed to this antagonism in the collective bargaining relationship 
in an address to workers during a public sector workers’ strike on Parliament in 
March 1997 when he stated that 
 
Government’s participation in collective bargaining is so short-sighted and 
uncoordinated that it makes deals with minority unions and tries to 
marginalize the COSATU unions which represent a clear majority of public 
sector workers; where the composition and function of government’s 
negotiating team is so disorganized and confused that it spends more time 
arguing with itself than taking forward negotiations. 
 
The LRA (66 of 95) defines a service as a maintenance service if its interruption has 
the effect of the material physical destruction of any working area, plant or 
machinery. Provision for maintenance services can be made by means of a 
collective agreement or, alternatively, on application by an employer to the Essential 
Services Committee.  
 
The concern to contain industrial action which goes beyond the infliction of economic 
harm to the complete destruction of the wealth-generating capacity of the working 
area, plant or machinery, is the justification for this prohibition. To counter-balance 
this right, the Act prohibits the employment of replacement labour in the rest of the 
enterprise during such industrial action (Nel et al., 2005).  
 
The 1997/98 classification notice covers all workers in areas designated as 
essential. For example, not only are medical and paramedical staff and nurses in the 
health sector so classified, all support staff fall into the same category. In the medical 
area there are 13 categories of worker, from porters, receptionists and laundry 
workers to filing clerks and engineers, who are officially regarded as essential.  
 
However the LRA also makes provision for agreements to be struck between 
employers and the unions that would allow for minimum levels of service to be 
maintained during a dispute in designated essential services. This is an arrangement 
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similar to one that applies in Britain to fire fighting, nursing and ambulance services – 
all of which have, in recent years, staged strikes (Bell, T. Business report, 10 May 
2007). 
 
Furthermore, albeit that the LRA provides for the right to strike as part of the 
collective bargaining process, Mgijima (2003) states that for ‘those workers in the 
essential services for whom striking is prohibited, there is a provision for negotiations 
and the establishment of a minimum service during strike action’. He goes further, 
“Social dialogue is encouraged again in this regard (and) where a dispute remains 
unresolved, it may be referred to arbitration. 
   
SUMMARY 
 
Collective bargaining in South Africa’s public sector has known frequent volatility. 
The period before democratisation saw a public service that was sternly suppressed 
and where collective bargaining was virtually non-existent. 
 
Post-democratisation, which saw one of the most crucial pieces of legislation to be 
promulgated, the LRA and other progressive labour legislation such as the Public 
Servants’ Act, ushered in a new age characterised by negotiation in broad terms with 
the introduction of bargaining councils for the various public sectors. 
 
The next chapter will provide an analysis of the Public Sector Strike of 2007 using 
the conflict escalation and strike model proposed in Chapter 2. Moreover, it will 
provide a short diary of salient events in the strike. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE STRIKE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Various conflict handling behaviours are embedded in conflict models, and whereas 
the structural model endeavours to comprehend conflict trends, the process model 
centres on the inner dynamics of conflict episodes. An understanding of the conflict 
requires a connection between the two. In this regard Anstey (1999, p. 12) states 
that : a full understanding of any conflict must therefore give attention to both 
structural and process aspects of a relationship, and how they influence each other”.  
 
This part of the treatise will analyse the Public sector strike from its inception to its 
conclusion and the analysis that will be presented in this chapter will use Ruth’s 
conflict model.  
 
The protagonists in the strike each had its own view of how the process would unfold 
and the eventual desired outcome. The outcome was subject to factors such as the 
goals and demands unfolding, the resources available as well as the tactics that 
were employed.  
 
Anstey (1999, p. 50) writing on the South African Railway Strike of 1987 where there 
was a direr outcome, writes the following: 
 
The efforts of the employer, workers and their trade union to settle the matter 
reflect how differently parties in conflict can perceive events and actions, how 
a history of relations affects efforts to resolve a current problem, and the 
importance of jointly acceptable procedures and forums for conflict resolution. 
The culmination of the crisis reveals how dramatically intra-group and 
intergroup  relations can shift, locking the parties into conflict, reinforcing 
stereotypes and producing conformity pressures on individual players with, in 
this case, terrible consequences.  
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The preceding quote from Anstey sums up the process of escalation, and although it 
focuses on the SATS strike some parallels can be drawn. For instance, events and 
actions can e perceived differently by the parties involved. Not only can suspicion 
lead to or fuel inter group conflict, but it can also spill over to groups and compromise 
unity and solidarity.  
 
Earlier chapters of this treatise provided a picture of the parties involved in the strike 
and included a detailed breakdown of collective bargaining in the South African 
public sector. Terry Bell in reporting on the strike stated that “there seems to be 
widespread confusion about the current public sector dispute. This is hardly 
surprising given claims, counter claims, some misleading reports and the bandying 
about of sections of the labour laws. What we are witnessing is rattling and sparring 
by employers and unions, each trying to gain advantage in the deadlocked wage 
talks before any final confrontation or settlement (Business Report
 
, 16 May 2007).  
Mischke (2008) states that “the 2007 strike was so acrimonious that the parties that 
parties almost wiped each other out”. Moreover, the strike took place amidst strain 
amongst the tripartite alliance brought about by the government’s macro-economic 
policy and driven by COSATU. As mentioned in earlier chapters, COSATU being an 
alliance partner the strike also served as political outlet for unions, more particularly 
those unions affiliated to the COSATU federation.  
 
The British media commented on this political ‘outlet’ saying that the ANC is due to 
choose a new leader later in the year to succeed President Mbeki, with deputy ANC 
leader Jacob Zuma as a candidate. The strike was really a battleground for the 
various camps within the ANC ahead of the election (www.news.bbc.co.uk). 
 
The industrial action, described by unions as the biggest strike in post-apartheid 
South Africa, contributed to a major split between former struggle groups that make 
up the country’s ruling alliance. Trade union group COSATU, which was co-
ordinating the protest, was increasingly stating the merits of retaining its traditional, 
tripartite pact with the ANC (Irish Times, 06 June 2007). Similarly, Desai (2003) 
argues that “While there are common demands between Cosatu and these new 
social organisations, they differ on strategies and objectives.”  
71 
 
 
Another observation was made by Blade Nzimande, General Secretary of the SACP 
when he said that “whilst this (the strike) can be regarded as a normal dispute 
between ‘employers and employees’, it would be mistaken not to tease out some of 
the key underlying issues in the dispute. The strike is both a ‘normal’ employer-
employee dispute, but simultaneously about deeper class and ideological struggles 
in the state and the economy in contemporary South African society. It is therefore 
important to tease out some of these for the sake of understanding the deeper 
challenges facing the national democratic revolution in the current period” 
(www.sacp.org.za/pubs/umsebenzi).  
 
This chapter will provide a description of the strike as it unfolded. As indicated in 
Chapter 1, the strike will be chronicled using almost only press articles since at the 
time of research and writing, few academic articles covering the strike were 
available. A chronological table of the negotiations and the strike is provided at the 
end of the chapter on page 100.  
 
4.2 THE BUILD UP TO THE STRIKE-NEGOTIATIONS AND DISPUTE  
         RESOLUTION  
 
The Public Servants’ strike of 2007 was preceded by negotiations that were 
influenced by the political and economic environment of the time. Workers felt that 
the economy was booming but that they were not benefiting, and the growing 
frustration against the state was evident during the previous one to two day strikes in 
1999 and 2004 but became more pronounced in 2007.  
 
The unions submitted their demands on 24 October 2006 and formal negotiations 
started in November. The employer tabled its first offer of 5, 3% (to be implemented 
in July 2007) or 4% (to be implemented in April 2007). In March the unions declared 
a dispute and announced plans of strike action in May (IIRA, 2010).  
 
The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) news reported on 26 February 
2007 that SADTU threatened mass action over unresolved issues that dealt primarily 
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with curriculum issues and discontent with proposals linking teachers’ payment to 
that of the performance of pupils. 
 
The SADTU secretary-general, Thulasizwe Nxesi was quoted as saying that “if it is 
not resolved appropriately, we have agreed with those structures in the education 
alliance that we are going into action. Action means marching to the authorities and 
raising our concerns… Marching is not going to be an event, it is a process where 
we have to mobilise structures and it will be a rolling mass action”.    
 
On 18 April 2007 NEHAWU held its special National Executive Committee (NEC) 
meeting to assess developments on the public service wage dispute in particular the 
proposal presented by the state as the employer during the conciliation on Friday, 13 
April 2007.  
 
In an elaborate statement the NEC decided to: 
1. Reject the employer’s proposal with the contempt it deserves until the employer 
positively respond to all the demands of the trade unions admitted to the PSCBC 
which are: 
a. Increase wages/salaries by 12%; 
b. Reduce the current 16 notches to 5 notches and de-link performance              
from pay progression; 
c. Collapse level 1 and 2 into level 3 to reduce the wage gap;  
d. Fill all vacant posts to increase staffing levels ; 
e. Review medical and housing benefit; 
f. Implement wage/salary increases on 1 April; and 
g. A single term (one-year) wage agreement; 
 
2. Immediately set up the national and provincial strike committees to mobilise and 
monitor the strike progress in the public service until the employer address all our 
wage demands. 
 
3. Intensify mobilization for strike including pickets and lunch hour demonstrations in 
all public service institutions. 
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4. Call for an urgent COSATU Joint Mandating Committee meeting tom consider the 
latest developments in the public service wage dispute. 
 
5. Call on COSATU provincial joint shop stewards council to report back on the 
public service to force the state as employer to accede all our demands. 
 
6. Acknowledge the fact that public service workers have had enough of exploitation 
by the South African state over the years and they are not prepared to take it any 
longer.  
 
The government’s CPIX policy founded on a monetarist inflation targeting 3% to 6% 
was seen to impose constraints on wage increases for public servants. It places 
limitation on how much wage can be increased. This has been the conservative 
policy of the employer in the past years. The wages of workers are becoming 
increasingly insufficient to meet the rising costs of basic necessities of life, such as 
food, transport etc. The food prices have risen by 20% which takes up 45% or more 
of the income of workers earning less than R3000.00 per month 
(www.cosatu.org.za).  
 
Another observation is made is made by Bell when he states that the standard of 
living for civil servants, ranging from doctors, accountants and engineers to teachers, 
nurses, cleaners and security staff, had declined markedly over the past decade; 
which is why there is a groundswell of anger within the eight unions in the sector, all 
of which are committed to strike action if the government refuses to budge on its 16 
percent pay offer (Business Report
 
, 20 April 2007).  It is clear that there were definite 
causes of conflict that has the potential to trigger conflict if not resolved timeously 
and amicably.  
At this point a public service strike seemed inevitable and it was reported that 
COSATU was to meet leaders of public service unions on Friday May 11 to put the 
final touches to a programme of protest action that was likely to climax in the third 
state-sector pay strike in less than a decade (www.mg.co.za, 15 May 2007).  
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Another statement issued by COSATU on 15 May 2007 read that after a meeting in 
Johannesburg on the same day, leaders of the COSATU-affiliated public service 
unions agreed upon a programme of mass action culminating in an indefinite 
national strike beginning on 28 May 2007. This was in pursuit of the claim for a 12% 
increase and improvements to housing, medical and other benefits.  
 
The strike was preceded by a night vigil at parliament on 20-21 May and marches 
and rallies in every province on 25 May, coordinated by Joint Management 
Committees in each province. A meeting with the non-COSATU  
unions were held later that week to coordinate a joint programme of action uniting all 
public sector workers. 
 
The unions reaffirmed that while they were resolute in support of their legitimate and 
justified demands, they were ready at any time to re-enter negotiations if the 
government comes forward with a significantly improved offer (www.cosatu.org.za).  
 
On 16 May it was reported that NEHAWU and SADTU have received up to 90 % of 
support for strike action if necessary, and that the Independent Public Service 
Association, will declare the result of its ballot on Friday, 18 May. However 
indications are that this will be no different from the results announced by COSATU 
(Business Report
 
, 16 May 2007).  
At a combined meeting in Centurion it was decided that once all the strike ballots 
were in and if they were in support of action, notice of intention to strike would be 
given on 16 May, and seven days later, a legally protected strike would start, failing a 
last minute breakthrough. In the meantime, the 194 000 strong NEHAWU, together 
with the 9 300 member South African State and Allied Workers’ Union (SASAWU), 
also affiliated to Cosatu- have started on a work-to rule-regime.  
 
This action was dubbed a go-slow by public services minister Geraldine Fraser-
Moleketi. She maintained that a go-slow or work-to-rule would be illegal in terms of 
section 123 of the LRA. For although media reports tend to conflate the terms, there 
is a difference between a work-to-rule and go-slow.  
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By working to rule, workers will only do, “to the best of their ability”, the work 
described in their job descriptions and their contracts. As the unions see it, this is an 
action separate from a possible future strike. However, Fraser- Moleketi is relying on 
the protest clause in the LRA. This states that “the partial or complete refusal to 
work, or the retardation or obstruction of work” in the cause of promoting “the socio-
economic interests of workers” is illegal (Business report
 
, 16 May 2007).  
Despite this warning by the Minister, thousands of workers in essential services such 
as the SAPS, prisons and traffic control, as well as nurses and doctors, were due to 
declare a dispute (www.mg.co.za, 18 May 2007).  
 
Moreover, there seems to have been ‘ambiguity’ when it came to understanding the 
government’s wage increase, since it was said that the wage offer by the 
government to public service unions amounted to 12%, and that “employees are 
going on strike over 6%” In terms of the wage offer, Fraser-Moleketi said that the 
government’s offer includes a multi-term wage agreement, implementation of 
occupation-specific dispensations that will affect up to 80% of public servants, 
revisions of certain allowances by 25% and improvements on the government 
medical subsidy (www.mg.co.za, 17 May 2007). 
This statement by the Minister has been made out as ‘demeaning’ by COSATU 
president Willie Madisha when he stated that this statement “infers that the leaders 
of the unions all together here do not understand what the workers want. It further 
says that workers going on strike don’t understand what they want” (www.mg.co.za, 
18 May 2007).  
 
Six days later COSATU issued the following memorandum to government offices. 
The demands of which can be summed up as follows: 
 
•  A 12% increase commencing on 1 April of each year; 
• A reduction in the number of notches in the pay progression system and de-linking 
from performance; 
• Increase the employer contribution in the medical Aid to be in line with the Medical 
price consumer index and desist from forcing employees onto the Government 
Employees Medical aid Scheme (GEMS); 
76 
 
• Ensure that the home owner allowance is brought in line with a home of R300 000; 
• Fill all vacant substantive posts with immediate effect and create vacancies to 
meet the demand of the public service; 
• The closing of the wage gap by collapsing level 1 and 2 into level 3 
 
Unions vowed to withdraw their labour until these demands were met. Concurrently 
they indicated that they were willing to return to the negotiating table should the state 
be willing to drastically improve its current offer of 6%. Failure to meet these 
demands by 31 May 2007 will result in indefinite labour action by all unions until the 
demands are met (www.cosatu.org.za, 24 May 2007). 
 
As cited in chapter 3, the united front by government ministers was also seen as 
feigned since as COSATU has also said in a statement “it is quite clear to us that the 
Minister of Finance in contradicting his counterparts accepts that public servants 
must get a better deal given that the cost of living is spiralling out of control and 
beyond the reach of ordinary workers on a daily basis” (www.cosatu.org.za, 24 May 
2007).  
However, in as much as a strike seemed imminent, there was a flickering of hope in 
another COSATU media release noting that as COSATU public service unions the 
call of the Minister of Public Service and Administration for further talks between the 
parties to take place on the 28th and 29th
 
 of May was welcomed. 
The statement read that “Indeed we have been calling for real negotiations to 
commence in order to advert a national strike in the public service. However, this call 
does not suggest that we want to suspend our programme of rolling mass action. 
Our programme continues as planned till our demands have been met” 
(www.cosatu.org.za
 
, 24 May 2007).  
COSATU subsequently invited the media to marches that were to be held on 25 May 
2007 in the Free State, Northern Cape and Cape Town, which was seen as a 
prelude to the first united national public service strike, set for 1 June 2007 
(http://www.southafrica.info/; http://www.sabcnews.co.za).  
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On 29 May 2007 SABC news reported that a final round of talks to prevent the strike 
would resume on the 29th
 
 May at the PSCBC in Centurion near Pretoria. This after 
task teams from both government and unions worked throughout the night. The aim 
was to reconcile government’s 6% pay offer and labour’s 12% demand. The teams 
would brief their principals later that morning before deciding on a revised mandate. 
However, government’s 6% pay offer did not change. Louis Rapken, the 
spokesperson, said that the employer believed that the increment was fair. In light 
hereof, Thulas Nxesi, labour’s spokesperson, said public servants were fully aware 
of what government is offering and have rejected it unreservedly.  
 
While labour was holding the threat of a million public servants downing tools over 
government’s head, the employer is using labour law to fight back. Government has 
requested their 6% be arbitrated for essential services workers and have included 
teachers in this category. 
 
Although labour has rejected this, government said that it would only withdraw the 
arbitration request if a wage settlement is reached. Both sides accused each other of 
negotiating in bad faith but it is significant that for the first time in a week, labour and 
government were talking to each other. Moreover, in as much as there have been 
accusations of negotiation in bad faith, this could also be seen as a tactical ploy by 
government to ‘coerce’ labour into submission.  
 
On the same day (29 May 2007) the SABC reported that it had reliably learnt that the 
government has upped its wage offer to public servants to 6.5%. The offer came 
after technical task teams comprising representatives from government and labour 
worked through the night. The offer was expected to be tabled when formal wage 
negotiations resumed later that afternoon. However, labour’s sentiment after 
caucusing was not positive, and remained firm on their demand for a 12% increment.  
 
On 30 May it was reported that a working document tabled at the PSCBC offered 
progress in public-service pay talks. Said Minister Fraser-Moleketi: 
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This is a major breakthrough and while much work needs to be done, we can 
now start charting our way forward. This document is intended to provide a 
basis for the general salary adjustments of employees for the forthcoming 
years and to introduce revised salary structures for specific professional 
occupations. These include teachers, health professionals and certain legal 
professionals – ultimately 80% of the public service. It deals with timelines, 
career patching, pay progression grade progression, seniority, increased 
competencies and performance, all aimed at attracting and retaining 
professionals and specialists. It also looks to replace the existing terms and 
conditions of employment. Labour has agreed to consider this proposal in its 
entirety 
while negotiating certain aspects it also looks to replace the existing scarce-
skills framework for the public service with the introduction of revised salary 
structures (www.mg.co.za; www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
It was further reported that the demands originally tabled by labour were impossible 
for the state to meet, and that they would have added R200-billion to the wage bill in 
the first year of implementation – more than double the wage bill. In terms of 
increases, top nurses would receive increases in the region of 50% but a general 
increase of 6% would apply to the bulk of public servants. Clearly, from a tactical 
point of view, this was seen as making the trade unions’ demands seem 
unreasonable in the eyes of the public.  
 
The minister told the National Assembly there would be a new group of senior 
nurses with 10 years or more experience receiving this increase form July 1 this 
year. Educators of a senior nature would be included from January 1 next year 
(2008), followed by social workers, engineers and architects  from July 2008. 
Correctional service officials would follow from July 2009.  
 
In as much as the minister referred to talks as a ‘breakthrough’, COSATU rejected 
this as ‘misinformation’, saying that ‘either the minister is misinformed by her 
negotiators, or she is deliberately misinforming public service workers and the 
general public’ (www.mg.co.za, 31 May 2007). On this matter the SABC reported 
that a senior member of the PSCBC accused the public service minister of 
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misleading the public by saying that there had been a breakthrough 
(www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
After 10 months of failed wage talks both sides were now pulling out all the stops to 
force a compromise ahead of the start of that Friday’s rolling industrial action 
(www.sabcnews.co.za). On 31 May, COSATU held a public service union press 
briefing at its Cape Town offices. The unions announced the type of impact the 
public service strike would have on the different sectors and the participation they 
expected in the strike. 
 
The points raised would give an indication on minimum levels of service that will be 
available at the different public institutions and announced the participation of the 
essential service of the strike. The press conference included the unions that were 
part of COSATU as well as the unions that were not in COSATU. Collectively these 
unions represented 80% of all public service workers in the Western Cape. 
 
The COSATU statement read that: 
 
• There is no settlement 
• There is no new offer on the table 
• The unions remain far apart 
• Unions cannot seek new mandates for non-existent offers. Our mandate remains 
for a 12% increase plus improvements in benefits 
• The national strike called for tomorrow June 1st
• Unions will only seek a new mandate from members at the point when a 
significantly improved offer is on the table. 
 is going ahead 
• The document that the minister tabled to parliament was never tabled nor 
acknowledged at Council by the time the announcement was made.  
 
The statement then gave ‘some background to the present confusion’: 
 
• The employer requested the convening of the PSCBC after unions served notice of 
a strike commencing on 01 June 2007; 
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• Unions engaged on the assumption that the employer would bring a new offer to 
the table; 
• In order to facilitate the process a smaller group convened to explore options and 
scenarios of a possible settlement in order to break the current deadlock; 
• This technical team then met on 28 May to draft options and scenarios that could 
bring parties together; 
• This document that was developed as a result of that process was placed before 
the PSCBC on 30 May 2007 and it was resolved that the document be recognised 
as a working document for the purposes of discussion and/or exploring possible 
settlement options without prejudice to any party’s rights; 
• Council further resolved that on the  basis of the document only being a working 
document, any party may submit any further proposals for consideration and 
parties will not be bound by the working document; 
• This is not a settlement; it is not even a new offer. Indeed the employer’s 
negotiating team did not even have the mandate to officially offer the 6.5%, which 
the minister has been broadcasting in the media. Officially the offer is still 6.0%- a 
figure, which was blown out of the water by official inflation figures released 
yesterday (CPIX: 6.3%) (www.cosatu.org.za).  
 
Given the attitude of the government in the negotiations all unions committed 
themselves to on a full scale strike on Friday and Monday, thereafter assessing the 
commitment of government to find a solution. The attempts from government of 
intimidation of the workers are turning this wage dispute into a national crisis that 
would severely disrupt service delivery (www.cosatu.org.za).  
 
4.3 STRIKE PROCESS 
4.3.1 Conflict Behaviour 
 
On 1 June one million workers across South Africa went on strike shutting down 
public services throughout the country. While their immediate demand was an across 
the board pay increase, the strike also reflected workers’ growing dissatisfaction with 
the government. The strike was the country’s largest since apartheid rule ended in 
1994. The strike led to “a total public service shutdown,” with hospitals and schools 
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reportedly particularly hard hit. Courts and government offices were also affected 
(www.labornotes.org). 
 
An SABC report stated that the first day of the national public sector strike was an 
“overwhelming triumph”. It stated further that ‘the vast majority of the 700 000 
workers called to upon to strike heeded the unions’ call.” The unions said that many 
strikers joined marches around the country. “Big contingents from every union filled 
the streets in angry and militant, but also disciplined and peaceful protest.” They said 
even the government conceded the turnout was massive. 
 
The unions criticised police action against workers in the Western Cape and said 
that unions met police about this. “We only hope that the message has got through 
to the government, in particular the minister of public services and administration, 
that the workers are united and determined to fight on until there is a substantially 
better offer than the six percent ‘wage decrease’ currently,” the unions said 
(www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
In the Western Cape, about 60% of schools in the province have been affected by 
the strike on 1 June. Gert Witbooi, a departmental spokesperson, said that several 
schools were closed for the day. He said that more than 50% staff failed to turn up 
for work. Said Witbooi: “We are looking into the matter since there was a clear 
directive that no schools were allowed to be closed for the day and only in 
consultation with the department can they make that decision.” Witbooi said that they 
would meet that following week to discuss the effect of the strike on the mid-year 
examinations. He said that on the whole, just about half of the teachers have been 
striking” (www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
Meanwhile the National African Teachers Union (Natu) has given government an 
ultimatum of 48 hours to respond to their grievances. Union members marched today 
to the KwaZulu Natal legislature in Pietermaritzburg as part of the strike. Allan 
Thompson, a Natu spokesperson, said that government failed to ensure safety in 
schools and to fill vacant posts. He said that this impacts the quality of education. He 
said that they will embark on other forms of protests if their demands are not met. 
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Meanwhile, the Western Cape health department promised swift disciplinary action 
against workers in essential services who participated in the strike on 1 June. Pierre 
Uys, the provincial health minister, said that about 2000 workers out of 26 000 
participated in the strike in the province. Said Uys, “We must apply discipline in our 
facilities. It’s not only a clear direction from the provincial government but also from 
the national government and the normal rule will be applicable – no work no pay. 
And of course, we will also have to see as to whether there is other action, like 
disciplinary action, that can be taken against them” (http://www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
In the Eastern Cape it was confirmed that all the June examinations had been 
suspended across the Eastern Cape schools. Sadtu in the province said no teaching 
and learning took place in the public schools. Mxolisi Dimaza, Sadtu’s provincial 
secretary said: “In the Eastern Cape, education has been affected already, that has 
been demonstrated by a decision taken by the superintendent general for education 
yesterday. She pronounced that all exams that were going to take place in June to 
be suspended, pending and the resolution of the strike action” 
(www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
The first day of the strike was not without incidents. In Cape Town, one person was 
injured after police fired stun grenades into a picketing crowd at Tygerberg Hospital’s 
main entrance. The crowd then backed off to allow staff inside who was not part of 
the strike. Patients were also able to enter the hospital. Cosatu stated that reports 
were received of police brutality against workers in the Western Cape 
(www.sabcnews.co.za; www.cosatu.org.za).  
 
Despite government receiving an interdict which prevented unions from encouraging 
essential workers to strike, workers from the Department of Correctional Services 
went on strike. The Department said that it will investigate the absenteeism of 54 of 
its officials on 1 June. A correctional services manager in the Eastern Cape was 
likely to be charged after he allegedly locked officials inside a prison during the 
strike. 
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Also, a POPCRU spokesperson, said that members in the police and correctional 
services were providing a minimum service. For example, if the police officer’s 
contract said he must handle three dockets per day, which is  
what their members had done, no more. A dispute was also declared at the Safety 
and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSBC) on minimum service level 
agreements. The union wanted to be able to offer a skeleton service while the rest of 
the workers go on strike, but the employer wants to declare the entire services as 
essential. 
 
Pat Ntsobi, a POPCRU spokesperson, said this was irresponsible because cooks, 
gardeners or administrators do not form part of essential services as their absence 
would not lead to loss of life or of property, or pose danger. POPCRU said that the 
mood on the ground would determine the final course of action, because its 
members want to be part of industrial action (www.sabcnews.co.za, 3 June 2007
 
).  
However, government went ahead and made “examples” of striking essential service 
workers when it fired some 600 striking nurses, saying that their walkout was illegal 
(www.labornotes.org). Not only did this action lead to an escalation of the conflict, 
but it also added issues to the dispute. Another report said that the Department of 
health began firing health workers with the Minister of Health quoted as having said 
that “All provincial health departments should commence issuing letters of 
termination of service with immediate effect” (www.businessreport.co.za). 
 
Those fired were a small group which did not include many who want to return to 
work, but are afraid to do so, the Health Minster said. She added that police were 
being deployed to ensure those state employees who wanted to return to work, 
could. COSATU on he other hand called these dismissals provocative and Moeketsi 
Mohai, General Secretary of the South African Democratic Nurses Union (SADNU) 
reacted in a media statement by labelling the decision as ‘shocking’ and saying that 
the dismissal is implying that ‘these services are not essential (if government can 
dismiss thousands of health workers, then the services can’t be essential) 
(www.cosatu.org.za).  
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Moreover, this selective dismissal in the context of collective action can be 
interpreted as a means to divide and rule labour, since the possibility of sowing 
seeds of mistrust and division within the ranks of the unions would put the 
government in a stronger position strategically.  
 
On the education front, Sadtu’s Deputy Secretary General responsible for 
bargaining, Don Pasquallie indicated that government’s offer of a 5.3% increase in 
April was already 0.6% lower than the CPIX measure of 5.9% for the same month. 
Government was offering workers a 6.5% increase and with the CPIX at 6.3%, the 
net proposed increase would amount to 0.2%. Said Pasquallie: “Current research 
reveals that food and transportation costs range between 8 and 9%. 
 
Cabinet released a statement on 13 June regarding the developments of the strike 
and outlined the following points: 
• In addition to the annual increase of 6.5% or 7.25% as proposed by the mediators, 
our offer includes increasing the housing allowance, increasing the medical aid 
contribution; q 25% adjustment to nightshift, special and danger allowances and 
full implementation of overtime payment as per Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (BCEA).  
• The adjustments will amount, for those who access the housing allowance and 
belong to GEMS, to an 18% increase for the lowest paid workers and about 9.4% 
for the highest paid employees in the public service 
• This package recognises seniority, period of service, performance, qualifications 
scope and nature of work. For instance, employees with longer service will earn 
higher salaries. In short, the 6.5% is a general increase which is the minimum that 
every public servant will receive in addition to these benefits 
• While the details of the Occupation Specific Dispensation will be negotiated, we 
envisage for instance, that a professional nurse with the current starting salary of 
R79 000 per annum (excluding benefits) will see an increase to R90 000 and  
nurse with an excellent performance of five years will receive an increase of 22%. 
The starting salary of a teacher with a four-year qualification will increase from 
R99 540 to R105 741 (excluding benefits). 
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Labour also timed the use of information cleverly for mobilization purposes when it 
commented on the suggested wage increases of political office bearers by the 
Moseneke Commission. However, the cabinet released a statement that focused on 
what it calls ‘misinformation coming from some quarters” suggesting that political 
office bearers have received salary increases in excess of 50% as recommended by 
the Moseneke Commission. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
 
These recommendations are exactly that and government has not accepted them. 
The Presidency is communicating with the chairperson of the commission and a final 
decision will be communicated once a decision has been taken in this regard 
(www.gcis.gov.za).  
 
The above issue was indeed a very contentious issue during the strike and added 
fuel to the fire in the wake of public servants being labelled as being unreasonable in 
refusing to accept government’s offer.  
 
At this time, medical workers also joined the strike, even though as “essential 
workers’” they are legally barred from going on strike. The government has said that 
striking medical workers would be fired and dismissals have been announced at 
some hospitals. Unions condemned the dismissals, and patients have expressed 
support for the strikers at some hospital. 
 
However, there have also been reports of strikers intimidating those who continued 
to work. About 30 strikers were arrested Monday, 11 June, accused of intimidating 
staff at a hospital in the central city of Bloemfontein. And on the forth day of the 
strike, police fired stun grenades to disperse around 500 protesters who were 
preventing doctors form entering a Cape Town hospital (www.time.com
 
).  
COSATU reacted in a statement saying that “the trade unions have consistently 
condemned acts of violence and intimidation by either side in this dispute. But what 
could be more intimidatory than to kick workers out of their jobs when they are 
struggling to improve their lives. It is the sort of callous provocation one would expect 
from the worst maverick employers in the private sector- unforgivable from a 
democratically elected government put in power by the working class and the poor. 
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The employers’ bullying tactics will enrage the workers and make them all the more 
determined to continue and intensify the strike” (www.cosatu.org.za).
 
 At this point it 
has become clear that there has been a shift to the merits of the tactics versus the 
issues at stake.  
The General Secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi warned that the strike could 
soon turn violent, and that unions were quite aware of the consequences of allowing 
the strike to prolong to the second and to the third week. He said that “workers will 
soon be angry; they will be frustrated, and will see anybody going to work, 
irrespective of how genuine their reasons are, as basically betraying their cause” 
(www.mg.co.za, 11 June 2007).  
 
Business News reported that mediators Charles Nupen and Meshack Ravuku who 
were called in late on Thursday, 7 June 2007 to try and break the impasse in the 
bargaining council. By yesterday the parties had broken up into “employer” and 
“labour” caucuses so each could develop single documents outlining issues and 
demands. Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, who attended yesterday’s press 
conference, said that it was not possible “at this point to determine the cost of the 
strike, which is about to enter its third week” (www.bday.co.za
 
).  
At this point there were threats from private sector unions that they would join the 
strike out of solidarity if an agreement was not reached in the bargaining council. 
This would be a one-day sympathy strike on the Wednesday (www.saird.com). 
Moreover, in as much as there was solidarity and cohesiveness within the unions 
(COSATU-affiliated unions on the one hand, and non-affiliated unions on the other 
hand), there also appeared to be division when it came to the government’s wage 
offer. 
 
In this regard, SABC news reported that ‘while SADTU and NAPTOSA have rejected 
the latest wage increase of 7.25%, the Suid-Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie (SAOU) 
said the total package is acceptable. 
 
Teachers in the public and private sector have been urged to join tomorrow’s strike 
action, as SADTU and Naptosa remain steadfast on 10% demand 
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(www.sabcnews.co.za). With the SAOU declaring that it was prepared to accept 
governments wage offer, there appeared to be division and the prospects of de-
escalation increased, but not before a final surge by the remaining unions to hold it 
together.  
 
Dave Balt, president of Naptosa said that the 7.25% is an unacceptable level 
because it is too close to the inflation rate and it has taken money away from the 
housing subsidy. Willie Madisha, the SADTU president, said that they have moved 
from 12% to 10% and what they want to see is actual fresh money put into the entire 
basket and at the moment, there is nothing really coming forward 
(www.sabcnews.co.za). This hard-line attitude from the side of labour showed 
unwillingness on the side of labour to bargain within the bargaining structures, and 
increases a win-loose outcome.  
 
To underline this division, the SABC reported on 12 June that SAOU members 
returned to the classroom. Said Huw Davies, the CEO of SAOU, 
 
Our range of settlement has always been somewhere around where the 
general salary offer now is, together with the progression plus the occupation 
specific dispensation. So we are not uncomfortable with what is on the table.  
 
The SAOU, however cautiously said that they would follow the outcome of talks 
between other unions and the government, and that school governing bodies and 
principals would decide whether schools should be closed for safety reasons 
(www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
As this point contradictory claims by the parties involved surfaced. The SABC 
reported on 13 June that countrywide pay protests by public servants ended 
peacefully on Wednesday with sharply conflicting claims on the turnout. One union 
said 600 000 workers took part in countrywide marches, while the government put 
the figure at 70 000.  
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At this time reports about the strength of the action surfaced, and the two opposite 
interpretations indicated that these reports were either facts or spin tactics to inflate 
or deflate the strength of the strike. 
 
In this regard COSATU spokesperson Patrick Craven said that initial reports 
suggested that Wednesday’s events had been “excellent”. Solidarity action from 
municipal workers and taxi drivers indicated the “depth and support” for the public 
servants. The Public Service and Administration Department, however, said the 
mass action had a “minimal impediment” on most service delivery.  
 
The department’s spokesperson, Lewis Rabkin said that “It is estimated that in all 
centres across the country 70 000 workers participated in the marches”. However, 
NEHAWU said reports showed a significant or general public-service shutdown, 
“despite government’s obvious propaganda to the contrary”.  
 
COSATU president Willie Madisha vowed that the “war against government over 
public servants’ wages would continue. Ministers should resign and go back to their 
roots and experience workers’ problems”. Moreover, Cosatu secretary General 
Zwelinzima Vavi said in Cape Town: “We are moving back, not an inch. So the 
government has a choice: Do they see a long, long, winter, or do they want to 
settle?” There were 43 marches countrywide in support of the unions’ 10% wage 
hike demand (www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
Moreover the government on Wednesday (13 June) accepted a proposal for a 7.25% 
wage increase, up from its earlier 6.5% offer. Said Lewis Rabkin, “Recognizing that 
we are 13 days into industrial action, and further recognizing the toll that this is 
taking on all sectors of society, we felt it incumbent upon us to accede to the 
proposal”.  
 
Analysts said that the strike would have a negative impact on South Africa’s image. 
“The inability of the partners to resolve the strike quickly does play into negative 
perceptions about South Africa. It’s bad for the image of the country to have a 
protracted public-sector strike,” independent policy analyst Ebrahim-Khalil Hassen 
was quoted as saying. 
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Yet another opinion in this regard was that of South African of Business consultant 
Bill Lacey saying that ‘people looked at South Africa at being an unusual situation in 
that we’ve reached a pretty harmonious way of resolving differences through 
consensus. That seems to have undermined the public servants’ strike” 
(www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
In the wake of reports that the strike was tarnishing the country’s image, the ANC 
also called on all striking public workers to resist elements that “are bent on acts of 
violence and intimidation”. In a statement, the party said it commends the majority of 
strikers for their disciplined and peaceful manner. “However, we deplore the violent 
acts that have accompanied some protests in the past 12 days, including 
intimidation, assault and he destruction of property (www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
Added pressure on the strikers to abandon their position came when it was reported 
that the strike has already cost lives after paramedics attending to accident victims 
were turned away from the some hospitals, and a baby died after nurses refused to 
allow its mother into hospital (www.sabcnews.co.za
 
). 
On 14 June the Mail and Guardian reported that Jacob Zuma, the deputy leader of 
the ANC, at the time of writing a possible successor to President Thabo Mbeki both 
as party leader and head of state, said negotiations since the start of the strike on 
June 1 indicated a compromise between the government and unions was possible 
and unions should have been explored beforehand. 
 
Speaking to Agence France Presse (AFP), one day after thousands of extra workers 
joined the stoppage; he was quoted as saying that “I think that both parties should 
have found a solution before the strike.” He continued and said that “my 
understanding is that some movements have been done (in negotiations), which 
indicates they could have been before the strike” (www.mg.co.za
 
, 14 June 2007).  
Zuma also acknowledged that the strike did not do well for the country’s image. 
Zuma said that “I think it has not looked good for the country and these are matters 
that negotiators on both sides, labour and the government, should have taken into 
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account.” Themba Maseko, government spokesperson also added that “The difficulty 
we think we as government have is actually that there has not been sufficient 
reporting back and that negotiators and their members were not informed properly 
about he details of the negotiations” (www.sabcnews.co.za).  
 
Meanwhile workers still rejected the government’s accusation that the unions either 
did not understand the employer’s offer, or failed to communicate it properly to their 
members. In this response to this, Patrick Craven, COSATU spokesperson said in a 
statement to AFP, that the public servants’ strike “is driven by highly knowledgeable 
members and any new wage proposal will have to be acceptable to them. On the 
contrary, the strikers know exactly what is on offer. They have insisted that their 
unions reject it.”  
 
At this point the strike was already in its second week and was looking set to 
continue without any indication that either of the parties was anywhere close to 
reaching a compromise. Prakash Naidoo reported that on the Tuesday afternoon (12 
June) members of COSATU as well as the eight independent labour unions 
unanimously rejected a proposal made by independent mediators for a 7.25% 
increase. 
 
Unions this week have revised the initial demand of 12% down to 10% and said that 
they expected a similar gesture from government, whose last offer was 6.5%. 
 
In terms of sympathy strikes in the private sector, the mining industry gave a sigh of 
relief after the 280 000 strong National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) had to withdraw 
at the last minute when it found it had not given employers the legal requisite of 10 
days’ notice. But at least six other unions, including SAMWU, had indicated that they 
were coming out in support of their public-sector service comrades. 
(www.free.financialmail.co.za
 
).  
On 17 June the Mail and Guardian reported that Cosatu affiliates would meet on 
Monday, 18 June to come up with a range of percentage increases they are 
prepared to accept to end the three-week old public service strike. It was understood 
that the Independent Labour Caucus had already set a percentage range within 
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which it could accept a deal. In this regard, Willie Madisha said that “the Cosatu 
unions have not come with any percentage. We’re still looking at ranges to finalise 
this thing.” 
 
Madisha, speaking from the PSCBC continued and said that “We are discussing 
occupation-specific dispensation, housing, medical aid and the return to work. We 
think we can be able to move forward; we have narrowed the differences, the only 
major problem is around the percentage.” This statement by Madisha clearly 
signalled the de-escalation of the conflict, but the labour remained hard on the key 
issues.  
 
In addition, Dave Balt of NAPTOSA said that “there isn’t a union that I know of that’s 
prepared to accept 7.25%. I would love o say we are close. It’s dangerous to say we 
are close. I think there is still hard bargaining to take place, but we are all… feeling 
the urgency and pressure to resolve this thing sooner rather than later 
(www.mg.co.za, 17 June 2007).  
 
Frustrated pupils also voiced their dissatisfaction about the protracted strike ay a 
Youth Day speech presented by the President in East London where they demanded 
an end to the strike by teachers that prevented them from writing exams. As his 
bodyguards and police moved in, the group of about 20 youths sang: “Silwela 
amalungelo ethu”, loosely translated from Xhosa as, “We are fighting for our human 
rights.” They also ripped up Youth Day celebration T-shirts in protest, and police 
forcibly evicted two members of the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) 
from the stadium (www.sundaytimes.co.za).  
On 18 June the Mail and Guardian reported that there is no sign that public servants 
are getting tired as their pay strike enters its third week. Said Vavi, “The strike 
continues… there is no sign that workers are getting tired, instead they are more 
angry. The strike continues as long as that has not happened.”  
 
At this stage there seemed to have been either a shift in tone or real movement on 
their positions, since it was reported on 18 June that there was a breakthrough in 
sight that would end the 18-day strike. Both government and labour representatives, 
who met the previous night in Pretoria, were hopeful that an agreement would be 
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reached. Thulas Nxesi, Sadtu general secretary said that the unions were optimistic 
about a quick solution to the strike. Nxesi said: “We don’t know the outcome at this 
stage, but all the parties recognise that the strike has had a negative impact”. The 
unions were consulting their members about what they would accept as a 
compromise.  
 
The government side also said it was optimistic. Louis Rabkin, spokesperson for 
minister Fraser-Moleketi said the parties had moved “a bit closer to the solution to 
this dispute”. The government presented a new offer on Friday, 15 June of a 7.25% 
increase, moving up slightly from its earlier offer on Friday a 6.5% pay rise. The 
unions backed down on their initial demands, coming from 12% to 10%. Though they 
have rejected the 7.25% offer, most of them fell it is a fair basis from which to begin 
new negotiations. Tahir Maepa, of NAPTOSA said: “We think the government needs 
to move up and we are hopeful that we will manage to move them.” 
 
Most of the 300 000 teachers who participated belonged to Sadtu and NAPTOSA, 
said that they wanted a quick resolution. Meyra Venter, a teacher with 21 years’ 
experience, said her monthly take-home salary was R5 800. A 7% increase in her 
pay would mean about R300 a month more. Venter said: “With this kind of salary, I 
need to use my credit to survive each month. Every year I use all my bonus to settle 
my debts. Said Venter: “This has become a vicious circle and it is a common 
situation among teachers” (The Times
At this stage some teaching and nursing staff resumed at certain schools and 
hospitals as the public sector wage strike entered its 18
, 18 June 2007).  
th
 
 day. However, many 
facilities were continuing to operate with skeleton staff. In the Eastern Cape there 
were still reports of intimidation aimed at health workers. 
Meanwhile, POPCRU was planning to go ahead with plans to join the strike. This 
despite the Labour Court granting the police an interim order prohibiting POPCRU 
members from striking. The union’s national executive is meeting to draw up plans 
for the strike (www.sabcnews.co.za). This threatening and hard-line move was 
indicative of power-based negotiations.  
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In a report in Business Day on 19 June, the Freedom Front Plus said that striking 
workers are loosing money and gaining very little as the strike continued. Said 
Freedom Front Plus spokesperson, Willie Spies,: “Workers who have been striking 
since June 1, have lost so much of their salaries that they will only recover the 
arrears at the earliest in February 2010, even with an 8t% increase, should they start 
working on 21 June again”  
 
Spies continued and said that he doubted whether COSATU affiliates thoroughly 
grasped this reality or had communicated it to their members. He said his party 
indicated last week that the strike was increasingly showing the colours of a political 
power play and had less to do with the circumstances of workers (Business Report
 
, 
19 June 2007).  
In reply to an SABC report, Cosatu released a statement in which it stated that its 
General Secretary, at a Young Communist League (YCL) rally did not, as incorrectly 
reported by the SABC, at any stage say the strike will be called off on 24 June. 
According to the report, he indicated correctly that the majority of the unions have, in 
discussions with the leadership of the federation, indicated that they are willing to 
accept the current government offer, subject to ongoing consultation with its 
members.  
 
 
Subsequently the public service workers reported to a meeting on 24 June that the 
results of their consultation with members are that the unions would not sign the 
agreement and therefore the strike continued. All the unions confirmed that no 
unions will be signing any agreement with the government until they completed the 
process of consulting their membership. The consultations would continue over the 
next three days. It was also decided that the unions would reconvene on the 
Wednesday, 27 June at 19h00 (www.cosatu.org.za).  
 
The resumption of talks would coincide with the opening of a crucial policy 
conference, which analysts predicted will be overshadowed by a leadership battle 
that has plunged the party into turmoil. On this, Susan Booysen, a political analyst 
stated that “from experience we know that this means an end to the strike is near. 
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This will strengthen the ANC and give the impression that it is in control in South 
Africa as it holds the policy meeting” (www.alertnet.org/the news/newsdesk.htm). 
 
At this time it was also reported that while the unions decided ‘overwhelmingly on 24 
June to continue their nationwide strike until the government comes up with a better 
offer, cracks are beginning to show in their ranks. If the cracks widen they could 
threaten labour’s united front that has seen the public servants hold out for three 
weeks” (www.bday.co.za, 25 June 2007). 
 
In a heading that read “South African Unions lose support for strike”, Wendell Roelf 
reported that “signs of a further erosion of support for a public sector strike in South 
Africa appeared on Tuesday, one day before labour and government were due to 
resume talks aimed at ending the costly wage dispute.”  
 
The report further stated that “cracks emerged in the nearly four-week-old strike on 
Monday after two unions representing some 160 000 members withdrew from one of 
the largest mass actions in South Africa since the end of apartheid in 1994. At this 
time the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers  (NUPSAW) 
announced that it had withdrawn from the walkout because the government has met 
its demands for pay increases” (www.alertnet.org/the news/newsdesk.htm).  
 
Three days later on 28 June, after several days of intensive, sometimes heated 
discussions and membership consultations, public service unions voted to end their 
national strike and accept the government’s “settlement offer’. The strike, which 
began on June 1 was the longest and largest public-sector strike in South Africa’s 
history and another 300 000, for whom it was illegal to strike, took part in militant 
marches, pickets an other forms of protest. Moreover, teachers and health workers 
were the militant backbone of the strike. More than 90% of the members of the 
220 000- strong SADTU and the 194 000 strong NEHAWU endorsed the strike call 
(Dixon, 2007).  
 
Speaking at the national congress of NEHAWU on 26 June, Zwelinzima Vavi said 
that the government’s offer, while much less than demanded, “represents some 
progress and gains’. He pointed out that the strike has surpassed “the historic 1987 
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mineworkers 1987 mineworkers strike in size It’s the biggest strike lasting over 25 
days involving between 600 000 to a million workers (on each day)” in the country’s 
history. 
 
Also addressing the NEHAWU congress, the SACP general secretary told delegates 
that the strike “has already achieved some major gains that you dare not 
underestimate”, especially the unprecedented unity of “about 1 million public service 
workers embarking on joint action irrespective of trade union affiliation” and across 
racial and occupational divides” (International News, Green Left Weekly
 
, Issue 716, 
4 July 2007). 
In terms of this unity, it could easily have not been the case since quite often unions 
within countries operate as rivals to each other thus weakening workers’ bargaining 
power when they confront employers or governments. The reasons for such rivalry 
are often political but sometimes they are also based on individual ambitions and 
power struggles (Jauch, 2003).  
 
However, as much as the ending of the strike on 28 June was hailed as a display of 
solidarity across a variety of divides, this also indicated a split amongst the COSATU 
affiliates. While NEHAWU, COSATU’S second biggest affiliate (and four other 
smaller COSATU affiliates including POPCRU) led by the capitulators, its biggest 
affiliate Sadtu is leading the resistance. Standing firm with SADTU, on the reduced 
demand for 10% pay increase, are NAPTOSA and the PSA.  
 
The unions’ decision to suspend the strike was preceded by the government 
effectively ending the negotiations, by tabling a signed final offer at the PSCBC in the 
week before. The government made the decision after it had issued an ultimatum 
only two days before, threatening the withdrawal of the revised offer of 7.5% as 
suggested by the mediators, and reverting to the previous offer of 7.25% 
(www.socialistworld.net).  
 
The strike’s conclusion had impacted the labour movement in a number of ways, of 
which the most significant is the future relationship between the state as employer 
and the unions. Moreover, the other effects are on the political and economic front, 
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and is also the argument that if political and economic conditions were more 
favourable, then there could have been another outcome altogether. Moreover, 
another question that remains to be scrutinized is whether the tactics employed by 
the unions in particular, were strategic enough. 
 
At this point a summary of the strike according to Ruth’s model will be presented and 
parallels will be drawn between the strike and the model. This will be followed by a 
table chronicling the strike whereas the following chapter, which is also the final 
chapter, will provide a concise and direct synopsis of the consequences of the strike. 
 
At this point it is imperative to refer to Ruth’s model (also presented as figure 6 on 
page 40) on the next page to provide a succinct analysis of the strike to enhance an 
understanding of the strike as it unfolded. 
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A CONFLICT MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF STRIKES 
SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
 
The sources of conflict can be traced to the unfolding political and economic 
conditions that public service workers found themselves in. Moreover, it is this 
environment in which negotiations unfolded which influenced the process, since 
workers felt that the economy was booming but that they were not benefiting (IIR 
presentation). 
 
Another observation is made by Banjo & Balkaran in their analysis of the 2007 public 
servants’ strike. Tracing the root of the conflict back to an idea of the International 
Socialist League (ISL) that the conflict in South Africa was not a racial conflict 
between black and white, and an economic or class conflict between the rich 
capitalists and the poor workers. Banjo & Balkaran (2009: 120) continue and write 
that: 
 
“One direct product of this kind of thinking and ideological framework was the 
massive expansion and steady growth enjoyed by multiracial public sector 
unions in South Africa just before 1994. The public sector unions in South 
Africa also grew in numerical strength and prominence in the context of the 
transformation ushered in by the post-1994 public sector reforms. Arguably, 
these post-1994 public sector reforms were the basis for the massive 1999 
strike…” 
 
In essence the reason for the strike was about wages and the impact of inflation on 
lives of public service workers. However, there were also political impetus and as 
Banjo& Balkaran (2009: 124) state, “this was because COSATU, although allied to 
the ANC government, was implacably opposed to President Mbeki’s economic 
policy”.  
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CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR 
 
Conflict behaviour was displayed when workers decided to go on a work-to-rule-
regime from 16 May 2007. Unions cited this action as different from that of a strike 
although the government said that it is tantamount to a strike and illegal. COSATU 
also invited the media to marches on 25 May.  
 
CONFLICT ESCALATION  
 
On 1 June close to one million workers went on strike across South Africa with 
schools and hospitals being the hardest hit. The strike was not without incidents and 
there were reports that the Western Cape police acted against strikers in that 
province. The uncertainty regarding the role of essential service workers in the strike 
also escalated the conflict when government went ahead and served notices of 
dismissal against striking health workers and prison wardens. There were also 
threats from the private sector in the first week of June that they would join the strike 
in solidarity with their public service counterparts.  
 
ESCALATED CONFLICT  
 
There was intimidation from both sides. Several government officials received death 
threats (Adams & Ngqiyaza, 2007 in Banjo & Balkaran, 2009: 126). Reports of 
intimidation of non-striking workers surfaced, after an incident at a Bloemfontein 
hospital where doctors were prevented form entering a hospital by striking workers. 
Police were called in and used stunned grenades to disperse workers. Despite the 
DPSA’s attempts to downplay the magnitude of the public sector strike, when the 
unions threatened a total shutdown of the public service, the country’s security opted 
for a show of force to ensure law and order. The police routinely used rubber bullets 
and tear gas on strikers and protesters.  
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DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICT  
 
Following negotiations on 18 June, there appeared to have been some movement 
from both sides of the conflict. Government increased its wage offer from 6.5% to 
7.25% and the unions moved from 12% to 10%. Consultation by unions with their 
members on the continuation of the strike ensued, with some unions like the SAOU 
indicating that they are willing to accept government’s offer. In an assessment off the 
strike COSATU acknowledges that gains and mistakes have been made, and states 
that “at this stage there are two dangers confronting the labour movement:  
 
1. The political defeat of the strike, and 
2. The strike fizzling out with HOSPERSA and NAPTOSA breaking ranks; and 
3. Difficulties arising out of different bottom lines and mandates amongst 
COSATU affiliated unions.  
 
Fragmentation of the labour voice can lead to unions individually signing with the 
employer (COSATU, 2007).  
 
At this stage NUPSAW also suspended its strike action by accepting government’s 
offer. Other unions voted to end their strike action on 28 June, officially ending the 28 
day strike.  
 
IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES 
 
There is no doubt that the strike involved enormous cost and had far-reaching 
consequences (Banjo & Balkaran, 2009). The aftermath of the strike was 
characterised by an increase in unity amongst public service unions. However, 
unions also incurred substantial costs including the cost of defending employees 
who were dismissed (Business Report
 
, 2007).  
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Banjo and Balkaran (2009, pp. 127-128) list the following costs:  
1. The government was forced to find R5.4 billion extra to move its initial offer of 
a 5.3% to a 7.5% wage increase. 
2. The already stretched services experienced massive backlogs, to the 
detriment of poor communities (Business Report 2007). 
3. The cost of the strike was 500 000 worker days for each day of the strike 
(Business Report 2008). This added up to a loss of 12 million worker days at 
a cost of about R5.6 billion.  
4. The indirect costs were likely to have been even more damaging. These 
included heightened inflationary expectations, with the likely consequences of 
interest rate increases, a possible loss of investor confidence in South Africa; 
and damaged relationships between striking workers and their employers. 
5. Several hundreds of patients died during the strike because of alack pf 
ambulances or because hospitals were providing only limited services.  
 
Insofar as the consequences for government are concerned, Banjo and Balkaran 
(2009, p. 128) highlights the following implications:  
 
• First, it set a benchmark for wage settlements in all sectors by curbing the 
increase, the state moved towards limiting the inflationary impact of the 2007 
wage increases.  
• Second, the negotiation process started by laying the groundwork for differential 
pay, for different levels of achievement. 
• Third, the overtly political, intra-party-alliance nature of the strike was clearly 
exposed. Workers within the movement were made to realise that the strike 
involved more than a battle for better pay and working conditions. The public held 
the unions accountable and this will probably make future widespread, multi-
sector strikes less likely.  
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RESIDUAL EFFECTS 
 
Besides the economic effects of the strike that is set to continue long after the 
conclusion of the strike, there also remains equally enduring effects insofar as 
collective bargaining is concerned. The IIRA report cites the following challenges 
facing both parties: 
 
1. Possible radicalisation of public servants 
2. Capacity of parties to bargain effectively 
3. Mandating processes  
4. Impact of the informal (alliance processes) on the formal negotiations within 
the PSCBC 
5. Future negotiations and collective bargaining  
6. Essential services 
7. Future of centralized bargaining 
 
Collective bargaining challenges 
1. Collective bargaining challenges and the budgetary process 
2. Governance and the Council 
3. A single public service 
 
Moreover, the question also arises whether the labour movement and COSATU in 
particular can repeat such mass mobilisation in future, particularly in the wake of 
OSD payments that remains largely unpaid. In this regard, several wildcat strikes 
erupted in 2009 of which Banjo & Balkaran lists the doctors strike, the correctional 
services strike, the teachers’ strike and the soldiers’ strike.  
 
Amidst these developments on the labour front, there remain the political 
ramifications of the strike within the alliance partners. The role of COSATU within the 
alliance remains questionable insofar as the federation’s impact on policy is 
concerned. But more importantly though, is the question of whether labour has the 
will to have honest introspection about its effectiveness as an alliance partner 
regarding its role. However unpopular the result of such introspection might be, 
labour has come to a cross road and it needs to deliberate its options cautiously. To 
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position itself strategically and affect outcomes favourable to the masses it 
represents, there needs to be concise action and no political favour seeking.  
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4.4 SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS  
 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
DATE EVENTS 
24 October 2006 Unions submitted their demands  
November 2006 
 
Formal negotiations start 
February 2006 
 
Employer tabled its first offer of 5.3% (July implementation) or 4% (April 
implementation) 
 
26 February 2007 
 
The SABC news reported that SADTU threatened mass action over 
unresolved issues that dealt primarily with curriculum issues and discontent 
with proposals linking teachers’ payment to that of the performance of pupils. 
 
March 2007 
Unions declared a dispute and announced plans of strike action in May. 
13 April 2007 
 
Government proposal presented to NEHAWU regarding wage dispute. 
 
 
18 April 2007 
 
NEHAWU held its special NEC meeting to assess developments on the public 
service wage dispute and the government proposal presented on 13 April 
2007. 
 
 
 
11 May 2007 
 
The Mail and Guardian newspaper reports that a public service strike seemed 
inevitable and it was reported that COSATU was to meet leaders of public 
service unions on Friday May 11 to put the final touches to a programme of 
protest action.   
 
 
15 May 2007 
 
COSATU statement after a meeting in Johannesburg read that leaders of the 
COSATU-affiliated public service unions agreed upon a programme of mass 
action culminating in an indefinite national strike beginning on 28 May 2007.  
 
 
 
 
16 May 2007 
 
• Reports that NEHAWU and SADTU received up to 90 % of support for 
strike action if necessary, and that the Independent Public Service 
Association (IPSA), will declare the result of its ballot on Friday, 18 May.  
• A combined meeting in Centurion decided that once all the strike ballots 
were in and if they were in support of action, notice of intention to strike 
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would be given. 
• The 194 000 strong NEHAWU, together with the 9 300 member 
SASAWU, also affiliated to Cosatu- started on a work-to rule-regime.  
• Unions vowed to withdraw their labour until these demands were met. 
Concurrently they indicated that they were willing to return to the 
negotiating table should the state be willing to drastically improve its 
current offer of 6%. Failure to meet these demands by 31 May 2007 will 
result in indefinite labour action by all unions until the demands are met. 
20-21 May 2007 A night vigil at parliament. 
 
 
24 May 2007 
 
• COSATU invites the media to marches that were to be held on 25 May 
2007 in the Free State, Northern Cape and Cape Town.  
• COSATU media release noting that further talks between the parties will 
take place on the 28th and 29th of May. 
 
 
25 May 2007 
 
Marches and rallies in every province coordinated by Joint Management 
Committees in each province. A meeting with the non-COSATU  
Unions were held later that week to coordinate a joint programme of action 
uniting all public sector workers. 
 
28 May 2007 
 
The technical team meets to draft options and scenarios that could bring 
parties together. 
 
29 May 2007 
 
The SABC reported that a final round of talks to prevent the strike would 
resume on the 29th
 
 May at the PSCBC in Centurion near Pretoria.  
 
 
30 May 2007 
 
Document drafted by technical team placed before PSCBC where it was 
resolved that it be recognised as a working document for the purposes of 
discussion and/or exploring possible settlement options without prejudice to 
any party’s rights. 
 
 
 
 
31 May 2007 
 
• COSATU held a public service union press briefing at its Cape Town 
offices and announced the type of impact the public service strike would 
have on the different sectors and the participation they expected in the 
strike. 
• COSATU rejects the working document and announced that the national 
strike called for 1 June will continue.  
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1 June 2007 
 
• One million workers across South Africa went on strike shutting down 
public services throughout the country. 
• In the Western Cape, about 60% of schools in the province have been 
affected by the strike on 1 June. 
 
2 June 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• The Western Cape health department promises swift disciplinary action 
against workers in essential services who participated in the strike on 1 
June. About 2000 health care workers out of 26 000 participated in the 
strike in the province. 
• The Eastern confirms that all the June examinations had been suspended 
across Eastern Cape schools. 
• The Department said that it will investigate the absenteeism of 54 of its 
officials on 1 June. 
• A correctional services manager in the Eastern Cape was likely to be 
charged after he allegedly locked officials inside a prison during the strike. 
 
4 June 2007 
 
The police fire stun grenades to disperse around 500 protesters at a Cape 
Town hospital.  
 
 
7 June 2007 
 
Mediators Charles Nupen and Meshack Ravuku were called to try and break 
the impasse in the bargaining council. 
 
 
11 June 2007 
 
About 30 strikers arrested and accused of intimidating staff at a hospital in 
Bloemfontein.  
 
 
 
 
 
12 June 2007 
 
• SAOU members return to the classroom. 
• Conflicting claims on the number of strikers between government and 
participating trade unions.  
• Prakash Naidoo reports that members of COSATU as well as the eight 
independent labour unions unanimously rejected a proposal made by 
independent mediators for a 7.25% increase.  
• Cabinet releases a statement regarding the developments of the strike.  
• Government accepts a proposal for a 7.25% wage increase, up from its 
earlier 6.5% offer.  
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14 June 2007 
 
The Mail and Guardian reports that Jacob Zuma, the deputy leader of the 
ANC, at the time of writing a possible successor to President Thabo Mbeki 
both as party leader and head of state, said negotiations since the start of the 
strike on June 1 indicated a compromise between the government and unions 
was possible and unions should have been explored beforehand. 
 
 
 
 
15 June 2007 
 
• Government presents a new offer of a 7.25% increase, moving up slightly 
from its earlier offer of a 6.5% pay rise. 
• Unions backed down on their initial demands, coming from 12% to 10%. 
Though they have rejected the 7.25% offer, most of them fell it is a fair 
basis from which to begin new negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
17 June 2007 
 
• Government and labour representatives met in Pretoria to reach an 
agreement. 
• The Mail and Guardian reports that Cosatu affiliates would meet on 
Monday, 18 June to come up with a range of percentage increases they 
are prepared to accept to end the three-week old public service strike.  
 
 
18 June 2007 
 
The Mail and Guardian reports that there is no sign that public servants are 
getting tired as their pay strike enters its third week. 
 
 
19 June 2007 
 
Business Day reports that the Freedom Front Plus said that striking workers 
are loosing money and gaining very little as the strike continued.  
COSATU slams SABC reports that the YCL stated that the strike will be 
called off on 24 June.  
 
 
 
 
 
24 June 2007 
 
• Public service workers reports to a meeting that the results of their 
consultation with members are that the unions would not sign the 
agreement and therefore the strike continues. 
• All the unions confirmed that no unions will be signing any agreement with 
the government until they completed the process of consulting their 
membership. 
• The consultations would continue over the next three days. It was also 
decided that the unions would reconvene on the Wednesday, 27 June at 
19h00 
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26 June 2007 
 
Zwelinzima Vavi said that the government’s offer, while much less than 
demanded, “represents some progress and gains’. 
 
 
28 June 2007 
 
Public service unions votes to end their national strike and accept the 
government’s “settlement offer’. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In relation to the first research objective, emphasis was placed on the practice of 
social dialogue in the South African Public Service where views on collective 
bargaining were presented to inform a better understanding of this concept. Here the 
definitions of Bendix (1996) and Ndungu (2007) proved insightful. Part of the 
objective was to highlight the fact that collective bargaining is traditionally seen as 
the primary interaction between labour and management.  
 
The structure of labour relations prior to democratisation was constrained and public 
servants’ right to organize was limited. However, although the political system of the 
day splintered public service labour relations, the labour environment remained 
highly politicized. The post-1993 era saw an entrenchment of this propensity.  
 
The establishment of the Education Labour Relations Act and the Public Service 
Labour Act in 1993 and s23 of the LRA saw progress in public service labour 
relations, but this did not mean that such progress would be without hindrance. The 
fundamental thrust of the LRA was towards voluntary centralized collective 
bargaining- within an industrial sector. 
 
The establishment of the PSCBC, which coordinates collective bargaining in the 
public sector, further improved this relationship. Whereas the arrival of a democratic 
order signalled improvement relations, issues that troubled public servants continued 
to simmer.  
  
In order to organize the public service collective bargaining environment, the PSCBC 
selected the health and welfare, education and general public service sectoral 
bargaining council sectors for the establishment of bargaining councils.  The public 
service trade union movement, representing more than 90% of employees, of which 
20% belong to more that one trade union. 
Trade unions’ political and ideological background plays a crucial role in its 
membership. However, recent years saw employees joining multiple unions for 
reasons other than ideology or political affiliation. The strike itself represented 
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diverse trade union affiliation based on ideology. The strike action made it clear that 
collective labour action does not have to based on an ideological premise.   
 
This part also highlighted the contentious issue of essential and maintenance 
services in the public sector. Hassen (2001) argued that the existing agreements are 
extremely weak, since “essential services agreements were constructed at a time 
when government and progressive trade unions saw themselves as part of a 
‘coalition for transformation’. He further states that “since then bargaining has 
become more adversarial”. The fact that workers in these services can establish 
minimum services during a strike did little to limit their participation.  
 
The second research objective attempted to provide a short background of the strike. 
An analysis of literature relevant to the build of the strike was done to obtain 
information that was pertinent to the causes and progression of the strike. This 
analysis was supported by a detailed literature review of conflict in order to enhance 
the understanding of the strike.   
 
The conflict model of Anstey illustrated that the central characters of the strike 
individual views about the progression and conclusion of the strike. The state 
displaying a reluctance to succumb to the strikers’ demands contributed to a variety 
of impasses in the bargaining process. Not only did these impasses impacted 
negatively on the resolution of the strike because of its protracted nature, but it also 
had far reaching impacts on the bargaining relationship between the state as 
employer and the striking unions. 
 
The development of a conflict model for analytic purposes based on a literature 
review was the crux of Chapter 4. This part of the treatise is an attempt to provide a 
succinct analysis of the strike based on the model of Ruth (1994). Since the strike is 
part of a larger process, it cannot be understood without taking the contextual factors 
into consideration. Moreover, the process analysis will highlight the key moments of 
the strike.  
 
The causes of the strike augmented the existing strain between the alliance partners. 
The setting up of national and provincial strike committees which would also stage 
111 
 
lunch-hour pickets in all public service institutions was an indication that the strike 
that was unfolding would be substantial. 
 
This stage was characterised by threatening rhetoric form unions. Amidst calls that 
the state must concede to all the demands labour also made utterances that 
indicated its willingness to enter into negotiations, should government make a 
substantially improved offer. 
 
This stage was balanced on two positions. The one being an aggravator and the 
other being that of a moderator. During this stage, it can be argued that the unions 
were testing the water by pronouncing their intention to strike and mobilizing the 
unions, while at the same time maintaining a moderate stance by keeping the door 
open for renewed negotiations.     
 
Following consultations with unions and subsequent ballots on whether to continue 
with the strike, unions overwhelmingly agreed that it would embark on go slow 
action. The government’s reaction that this was an unlawful action was met by 
unions highlighting the difference between a go-slow and work-to-rule, stating that 
workers will only maintain minimum service levels described in their job descriptions 
and their contracts. This action triggered the unions to declare a dispute. Moreover, 
the government’s insistence that the unions interpretation if the wage-offer is shorts-
sighted also triggered the conflict.  
 
Against this backdrop COSATU issued a statement six days later which included six 
demands, with the 12% salary increase on top of the list. At this stage the unions 
were still adamant that should there demands not be met by 27 May, they will 
withdraw their labour. A factor that seemed to have escalated the conflict was that of 
the Minister of Finance contradicting his government counterparts since the minister 
stated that public servants must get a better deal. This provided the unions with 
another basis from which to agitate for their demands to be met. 
 
The subsequent COSATU statement that further talks would be held on 28 and 29 
May increased the chances of a settlement to be reached, although the unions 
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maintained that this dies not mean an end to their proposed action. Underlining this 
stance, COSATU invited the media to attend their marches across the country.  
 
Government’s inability to reconcile their 6% wage increase with that of the unions’ 
12% demand failed and was rejected unreservedly by the unions. In another factor 
that escalating the conflict, government explored legal avenues to stifle the unions’ 
resolve and avert the strike by labelling teachers as essential workers. 
 
Accusations of negotiating in bad faith and the shifting of goal posts during a stage 
where, despite the fact that talks were taking place could be interpreted as 
government using tactical ploy to coerce unions into accepting its offer. This certainly 
added fuel to the fire and led to a further escalation of the conflict.  
 
The working document tabled by government on 30 May was rejected by COSATU 
after it said that it would consider the proposals and released statement saying that 
there is no settlement and that the strike will go ahead. Government maintained that 
it would not be able to meet the demand due to budgetary constraints that would 
impact on service delivery. 
 
In a country already faced with accusations of poor service delivery, this could have 
been construed as an attempt by government to portray the unions’ demands as 
unreasonable in the face of greater challenges by the government.  
 
 
Despite attempts to revive talks between government and the unions, the conflict 
escalated to such an extent that 1 June saw more than one million workers going on 
strike. The fact that police took action against striking workers in the Western Cape 
did not help he situation much and COSATU voiced their disapproval about this.  
 
What indicated a change of tactics as a result of the strike, the provincial government 
of the Western Cape threatened to take action against striking workers by the no-
work-no-pay rule. The content and style of government statements also changed and 
took on a more threatening tone which included gaining interdicts against unions to 
strike. 
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This was answered by police and correctional services unions providing a minimum 
service despite further efforts by government to declare all these services as 
essential. The unions’ response was that administrative work for instance was not 
essential as their absence would not lead to loss of life or of property.  
 
In the health sector, the government went ahead and implemented its threat by 
dismissing 600 striking nurses.  These dismissals were labelled as provocative by 
COSATU and contradictory to government’s s stance that if these services are 
essential, then the dismissals are questionable. As mentioned in chapter 4, these 
selective dismissals can be interpreted as tactic to sow dissent within the ranks of 
the labour movement; since strikers would necessarily question their participation of 
they were to become victims of dismissals.   
 
The Cabinet statement released on 13 June outlined detailed increases of amongst 
housing allowances and medical aid contribution as well as night shift adjustments. 
Labour pointed to the proposed wage increases of political office bearers by the 
Moseneke commission, with government swiftly pointing out that these were mere 
recommendations.  
 
As stated before this issue exacerbated the issues at hand, especially in the wake of 
public servants being labelled as being unreasonable in refusing to accept 
government’s offer. A shift to the merits of the tactics versus the issues at stake 
became evident.  
 
Fears that the conflict could escalate further was clear when Zwelinzima Vavi 
warned of strikers turning against non-strikers who are seen as betraying their 
cause. A further indication of this was the private sector unions indicating that they 
would join the strike out of solidarity.  
 
However, amidst calls for solidarity, cracks also seem to have appeared amongst 
striking unions, with the SAOU stating that whilst SADTU and NAPTOSA would not 
accept government’s wage offer, that they would consider it. Indicative of the de-
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escalation process, this dissent within the ranks of labour threatened to divide the 
labour movement. 
 
At this point, conflicting statements between unions and the media surfaced on the 
number of strikers participating in marches. Whether it was just spin tactics from 
either side, it points to the de-escalation phase of the conflict. Moreover, 
government’s threats were increasingly ignored with COSATU’s statement that the 
“war against government over public servants’ wages” would continue.  
 
Thirteen days into the strike, government shifted their position on the wage increase 
from 6.5% to 7.25%, and although rejected by the unions, they conceded that they 
are open for a revised offer from their original demand form 12% to 10%. Coupled 
with the government’s continuous insistence that the unions did not fully comprehend 
its offer, the unions reiterated that it view this as insulting. Given the volatility of the 
situation, this did not aid movement between the parties.   
 
The resultant stalemate and lack of real movement between the parties, 
compounded frustrations within labour’s ranks, and the walkout by NUPSAW from a 
proposed march on 25 June signalled growing discontent between the unions and its 
strategic approach to the resolution of the strike. This dissent was an important 
factor in the conflict’s de-escalation, since the remaining unions conceded to 
government’s offer and voted to end the strike on 28 June.  
 
Immediate outcomes of the strike saw the resumption of employment and face 
saving exercises by labour where the strike’s gains were referred to. In essence, the 
strike also highlighted the government’s stance on a labour movement which, being 
part of its alliance seemed to have added sustained pressure on it to review its 
macro economic policy.   
 
At the time of writing the residual affects of the strike will manifest itself on all 
terrains, of which the political indicate to be the most likely platform from which these 
affects will be blasted. The forthcoming ANC Polokwane conference at the end of 
2007 will most likely see COSATU and the SACP re-thinking its loyalties and 
strategic position within the alliance.  
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Moreover, as stated in earlier parts of this work, the strike was really a battleground 
for the various camps within the ANC ahead of the election. Clearly, the strike has 
been more than a normal dispute, but it highlighted the deeper class and ideological 
disparities evident in the state and economy and contemporary South African 
society. A final observation is that should the political conditions were different, then 
the strike could have delivered a different outcome altogether, if not totally averted.  
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